The Consolidation of the Euro-regional Territory and Its Consequences: 
The Case of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region

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Abstract

The Euro-regions are the institutional expression of a particular way of cross-border cooperation between/among Member States of the European Union. They create organizations, policies, public services, processes and interactions of various entities, but also among citizens. That diversity allows us to analyze in the context of the borders of Spain and Portugal (one of the oldest border spaces in Europe) different types of cross-border cooperation, including models of formal and material cooperation, as well as informal and intangible processes that the residents of both sides of the border have developed throughout past centuries. To study these models and processes of cross-border cooperation we will focus the analysis on the regions of the North-West of the Iberian Peninsula, comprising Galicia and North of Portugal as political and administrative realities, asymmetric but complementary, in a community space as that of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region. The objective is to analyze if after those interactions we can conclude that the emergence of a cross-border governance strengthens the European multilevel governance; a question that we will try to answer by analyzing some elements of the Euro-region path dependence and some specific policy problems of this Euro-regional space.

Keywords

cross-border cooperation, Euro-regions, governance, formal-informal, material-immaterial, institutions, citizens

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Some political scientists and experts on issues of governance and public administration believe that their approach is complementary although necessary for the study of interdependence and cooperation processes that occur along a border space. Even more when we understand that the world has changed a lot since the signing, in 1864, of the Lisbon Treaty, a treaty that has singular importance in the Euro-regional analysis that we expound below.

Considering the global transformations produced during the last century and a half that have led to changes in the structures of states, governments and different multilevel administrations that coexist in a space of border which some refer to as post-modern (Kim 2014, 5-9), what question will guide our reflection on international borders? It relates to the evolution of border institutionalization from the 19th century until nowadays. How are we going to address such a challenge? From the categories of political science and the science of the administration, as in our case it could not be otherwise. We are going to rely on the historical neo-institutional analysis (Steimo 2008), in addition to the paradigm of multilevel governance (Hooghe & Marks 2001). Then, we will go beyond Deutsch, Burrell and Kann’s (1957) classic approach of the “post-Westphalian state” on the informal interactions (interdependence) and the creation of spaces of social and political mobilization (Deutsch 1961, 634-647). Because, we consider that approach, in our days and in the current European Union, free of armed conflicts, as a necessary but insufficient classification to understand the complexity of formal and informal, material and immaterial cross-border cooperation and governance.

Our objective is to defend the good governance approach, applied to cross-border spaces, or cross-border governance (Varela 2010; Varela 2013, 329-356; Aguilar 2013, 103-115), from the case study methodology, focused on the analysis of the Euro-region Galicia-North of Portugal. This choice has to do with the fact that we consider the Euro-region Galicia-North of Portugal as a metaphor and a device of the Government and its agents, which aims to organize formal, institutional and material activities on a fraction of the border between Spain and Portugal.

We think that only a part of the possibilities for cross-border cooperation has been developed through this institutional construction, leaving aside those that have to do with other entities comprising the everyday elements of exchange and interdependence; intangible and informal cooperation which constitutes the core, the raison d'être of cross-border cooperation in the current European Union (EU). Thus, the Euro-region is a metaphor that expresses the technocratic and institutional development of these two post-Westphalian states central governments that traditionally rule the border, in a context where Lipset & Rokkan’s (1967, 1-67) center-periphery “cleavage” continues to dominate the political, territorial and administrative power relations although less and less, because of the social,
economic and political transformations. These transformations involve an evolution of the state (“solid”), which represents Keohane & Nye’s (1998, 81-94) “hard power,” bureaucracy and diplomacy, towards another type of state, multilevel and more “liquid” (following Bauman’s expression), based on the “soft power,” governance and para-diplomacy (Aldecoa & Keating 1999). The solid part would be exemplified by the Working Communities, who practice formal and material cooperation; while, the liquid part, representative of informal and intangible cooperation, would be exemplified by networks of cities, Euro-cities, everyday exchanges among citizens, etc. All of them take place in the metaphorical space of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region. In the following table, we present the logical map of our working thesis:

This expanded analysis shown in the table above allows us to study the classic institutions that interact in the borders. While it reveals changing lines and cleavages where Euro-regions integrate types of formal-informal and material-immaterial cooperation (Varela 2014), that, besides generating new “policy problems,” are able to put in the cross-border agenda “policy windows” that present new institutions, through new public and private models of government and management of borders within the EU.

To prove our thesis we will rely on a brief narrative structure on the evolution of the borders in Europe in the last two centuries. We continue with a brief presentation on the most recent management mechanisms of these borders and their interdependencies within the EU. Afterwards, we focus our case study in the Euro-regional model and its application to the northwest area of the Spanish-Portuguese border. Finally, we will refute or deny our starting analysis of the Euro-regional institutionalization, its limits, possibilities and consequences, through an exploration on the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region and some of its impacts in the construction of old-new cross-border institutions. We leave for the final paragraph, or epilogue, a few summary thoughts on new approaches to the study of the government and management of borders.
EUROPE AND ITS BORDERS: WHO WE ARE, WHERE WE COME FROM AND WHERE WE ARE GOING

Europe and its borders are a political and social reality that has more than 2,500 years of history (starting in classical Greece). The Greeks already practiced active management of borders from the mythology and its famous “abduction of Europe.” They made a formal and informal logic that defined the pacts among its city-states as *isopoliteia* (horizontal links that generated mutual citizenship rights in those territories) and *sympoliteia* (agreements between institutions that generated shared structures) (Pascual 2007, 167-186).

In our present consideration, the *isopoliteia* would reflect what we define as informal and intangible cooperation based on citizens practices and interactions; while the *sympoliteia* would link to the more formal and material practices driven by the institutions of multilevel government and administration in Europe.

This formulation of practices of formal-material and informal-intangible cross-border cooperation (see graph below), on which we will insist later, implies a new approach on interdependence, cooperation and governance. We understand that this is necessary to address the growing complexity of the government and management of borders, cross-border governance ultimately, from the 19th century until the present.

In fact, as conventional wisdom says, winners write history. In this context, the winners are, mainly, the political and administrative power structures, in the end, post-Westphalian states. It is true that this has happened since the death rattles of the French Revolution in Europe, where treaties were the expression of an

![Diagram](image_url)
agreement between/among parties representing themselves, within a framework of absolute domination and without “checks and balances” of any kind. The Westphalian states and not the citizens were the ones who agreed to treat what, how and when to do it, leaving the administrative aspects in the background (Committee of Limits), forgetting the social aspects and the participation of citizens.

In the case of Europe, Spain and Portugal, treaties are suitable instruments to the configuration as imperial and pre-modern nation-states and they remain so even in our postmodern community. The “main difference” between yesterday and today is that the citizens are now the nation-state, being subjected all of them (with royal exceptions) to the law. In this sense we could even say more, because today nation-states and their government and management instruments have to be subjected not only to the laws, but also to the codes of legitimacy that are built around socio-political ideas and values of the citizens. In such a way that the activities and the treaties of a nation-state may be legal, but, at the same time, barely legitimate. This happens with the treaties that have to do with the regulations of an agreement on border limits between nation-states (like the Lisbon Treaty of 1864). Certainly, they are legal, even 150 years later. Nevertheless, are they legitimate? If so, where does the legitimacy come from? Who are the actors who legitimate them and which others don’t?

The study of these type of treaties, like Badajoz (1267), Alcañices (1297), Alcáçovas (1479), Tordesillas (1494), Madrid (1750), Lisbon (1864) or, the most recent, Valencia (2003), on cross-border cooperation, helps us to draw the step from “hard” to “soft,” from the post-Westphalian state to the multilevel state, from the center to the periphery, from bureaucracy to governance. In the end, from a solid model of understanding relations between states to a more liquid model of comprehension of the interdependences among entities that also are parts of the state, like the regional and local governments, business entities, and even, why not?, the citizens. In Lange’s words (2012, 45):

“This border [Portuguese-Spanish border] is considered to be one of, if not the, oldest border that remains to this day practically unchanged and stable. It was defined in the Alcanices Treaty of 1297, what could be considered a ‘pre-modern time’. However, the actual demarcation of the physical territory only occurs in the XIXth century, presumably when both countries (just like today’s modern states) felt the need of a boundary that was more precisely identified (Daniels et al. 2001).”

During the last two millennia, Portugal and Spain have formed as kingdoms, and even as empires. They have lived together (1580-1640), separated, demarcated
and delimited, with continuous practices of bordering and un-bordering (Cairo & Lois 2011, 11-22).

However, Spain and Portugal, far from solving their problems with the Lisbon Treaty of 1864, continued to hold disputes over their limits during the last two centuries, as we could see in the cases of Couto Mixto (López 2005, pp.177-183), in the 19th century, and Olivenza, throughout the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century. Apart from the positions between the two states, citizens who were initially considered vassals, later the managed ones and now, with some audacity, citizens-customers, never participated in the decision-making of those treaties, not even in the most recent one; because, those treaties are deeply rooted in the model of Nation-state that no longer exists. At least since the breakthrough in Europe of the practices of cross-border cooperation which began at the beginning of the last decade of the last century, a result of the policies and instruments of the European cohesion, and the successive administrative complements to the treaties, such as the cross-border cooperation agreements.

The Management of Borders in Europe: From the States to the Citizens

This brief review of the post-Westphalian state framework and one of its “hard power” instruments, such as the treaty, does not mean we should forget the instruments of “soft power,” which have been launched by several non-central governments or sub-national actors, as in the case of the regional and local governments in Europe, and even by citizens, in an informal way.

Thus, the conventions of cross-border cooperation between Spain and Portugal started with the creation of the Galicia-North of Portugal Working Community (1991), by focusing the analysis in this part of the Spanish-Portuguese territory. This kind of agreements allows us to glimpse another way of understanding a more plural cross-border cooperation, considering the number of actors, above all regional (Xunta de Galicia and Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional do Norte, CCDR-N)¹ and local, especially municipalities and associations of municipalities (Eixo Atlântico do Noroeste Peninsular and Uniminho).²

With the entry of sub-national actors, a new space is generated in parallel to the formal, central and diplomatic spaces, creating a network that is formal, but also peripheral and “paradiplomatic” (Keating), where interdependencies and co-

¹ Xunta de Galicia is the Galician government and Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional do Norte (CCDR-N) is the North of Portugal administration (in Portugal there are not political regions).

² Eixo Atlântico do Noroeste Peninsular means Atlantic Axe of the Northwest of the Iberian Peninsula; created in 1992, integrates the main Galician and Portuguese cities. Uniminho is an association of municipalities in the river Miño/Minho valley, created in 2006.
operation enrich themselves, multiplying and, in some cases, producing impacts through successive initiatives of cross-border, inter-regional and territorial cooperation (e.g., INTERREG). It is the case of the Declaration of Porto in 1992, which gave entry into the scene of cross-border cooperation to Eixo Atlântico (as a local associative entity of Galicia and North of Portugal, but through the Portuguese private law). Also, the most recent creation of the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC; first in Spain, that of Galicia-North of Portugal; Cancela 2013, 89-102) or the Eurocities Chaves-Verín and Tui-Valença (Lois 2013, 309-327). Even the emergence of wider public and private networks of entities of cooperation such as the Iberian Network of Cross-Border Entities (Red Ibérica de Entidades Transfronterizas, RIET).

It is true that the control of borders continues to remain under the responsibility of the central governments. Nevertheless, in parallel to the formal and institutional cooperation of different signs and conditions (under the umbrella of the funds and programs of the EU), there are sediments that have always figured in the cross-border spaces. Informal and intangible practices that coexist in the territory with the more formal and material, proposed by the Government (Cairo, Godinho & Pereiro 2009).

Even before the existence of kingdoms and empires, including borders among them; during the construction of the Spanish liberal state of the 19th and 20th centuries; prior to the construction of Europe and its enlargement processes, which fitted Spain and Portugal in 1986; exchanges, interactions and interdependencies already existed between both sides of the border. Legal and illegal practices carried out by those who inhabit the border (Varela 2013, 329-356).

This expanded vision of cooperation allows us to see how formal structures coexist with the informal ones, how the states continue to carry out part of their functions while the citizens continue to develop part of their lives. Although, sometimes, states and citizens come into conflict, as it happened in the municipality of Olivenza, where an international conflict generated an opportunity of cross-border and multilevel cooperation (Declaration of Olivenza, 2008). As is still happening in the management of European funds and programs that the central governments of both Member States negotiate in Brussels.

The main issue consists in knowing if, despite this “mixture” of Member States, multilevel states and citizens, there are changing lines allowing new institutions in the border spaces that can let us think about a cross-border governance, where all kinds of actors and private or public cooperation structures could fit.
EURO-REGIONS: BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IN THE GALICIA-NORTH OF PORTUGAL EURO-REGION

For some authors like Perkmann (2003, 153-171), Rojo (2009, 87-121) or Cancela (2013, 89-102), the Euro-regions in Europe’s borders are part of a different, asymmetric and novel institutional setting, from which it is possible (Domínguez & Pires 2014, 23-47) to reformulate, even, Europe (Rojo & Varela 2011, 1-16).

At the bottom, the Euro-regions, as borders, are conceptual constructions that make up “new territorial scales” (Perkmann 2007, 253-266). We could even say that they are “Foucaultian devices” of power expressing the need for the periphery to provide their cross-border management structures with a political structure, something difficult to achieve within the framework of the states. The Euro-regions introduced the regions and municipalities, their governments, administrations and citizens in the European multilevel space. Without them, the Europe of the States, Regions and Cities decapitates itself. The involvement of sub-national entities in European governance can increase its legitimacy and enhance its social perception, gradually. Because we already know that multilevel and cross-border governance is the method that best allows us to manage the conflict (Rojo 2005, 5-30; Rojo 2006, 119-142), or at least so it is reflected in the latest Report on Cohesion of the European Commission (Sixth Report on Cohesion 2014).

Today, the positioning of the sub-national actors in the international arena, as well as the strengthening of the structures of cooperation in an enlarged EU, allows paradiplomacy to explain the role of the sub-central actors in the world. Achieving new forms of social and political participation, as well as the management of services by citizens on common problems (Domínguez & Pires 2014, 23-47). Because a few years ago some authors confirmed the possibility of the existence of nations without a state (Keating 2001) and currently some researchers defend a democracy without nations (Filibi, Cornago & Frosini 2011). Others say, that in addition to public and private goods, there are also common goods (Ostrom 1990); and, finally, we have the ones that see Euro-regional spaces as the places to construct Europeanization (Oliveras, Durá & Perkmann 2010, 21-40). Ultimately, all these authors express the consolidation of the paradigm of multilevel governance promoted by the European Commission since 2001 and the Committee of the Regions since 2009, collected and updated in the current EU 2020 Strategy and in its Cohesion Policy for the 2014-2020 period.

However, the Euro-regions represent the political power of the Government in the territory, which continues to control the sovereignty of all multilevel political communities; leaving these instruments at the level of management, rather than the political; at the same time, they are an expression of the process of Eu-
ropeanization that Europe has lived during the past 25 years. Because as we have seen, although there are Working Communities, European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, Initiatives Cabinets, Networks of Cooperation... Nevertheless, decisions on what to do or what not to do in a border depend on the Iberian Summits, sovereign meetings where the two states and their respective central governments of Madrid and Lisbon agree on the Spanish-Portuguese border line.

How is the scene that has left the consolidation of the Euro-regions and the consequences of cross-border cooperation in Europe? In our opinion, we should focus the analysis on one of them, since the territorial, political, administrative and socio-economic diversity is especially asymmetric at the regional level (Chartron, Lapuente, & Dijkstra 2012, 1-26; Cordal 2010). Because the context of the current crisis also limits the successes of the Cohesion Policy and their formal instruments of cross-border cooperation (CBC; Scott 2014, 81-93), and as a result, at least partially, the process of Europeanization that has been taking place in our continent since the late 19th century. On this subject, the words of Scott (2014, 93) are quite revealing:

“Reflections on CBC within the EU thus must take into consideration the longue durée nature of creating cross-border political practices at the local and regional level. Indeed, CBC has rarely produced rapid results in terms of economic growth and regional development. Furthermore, local and regional actors develop cooperation mechanisms situationally and in ways that reflect both political opportunities and social and structural constraints. Despite all the shortcomings of the EU’s model of institutionalised CBC, institutional change elicited by EU policies and funding mechanisms has led to a degree of Europeanisation of co-operation contexts and thus of spatial planning and development dialogue. This is evident in the discourses, agendas and practices of cross-border actors; they very often legitimise their activities by referring to the wider political, economic and spatial contexts within which their own region must develop. Nevertheless, actual patterns of CBC practices indicate a rather disjointed and complex reality. The European Union itself cannot provide a central template for de-bordering Europe. This will rather depend on how a post-national Europe is interpreted, negotiated and constructed “at the margins”.”

The Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region: A Case, Various Experiences in Cross-border Cooperation
This case is paradigmatic in the Iberian context, since its area of influence leads the processes of cross-border cooperation along the Spanish-Portuguese “raia”
(borderline), and, we could even say, along all the Spanish borders (including the ones with France and Morocco). This leadership is owing to the starting political impetus of the responsible politicians of Xunta and CCDR-N in the 1990s. Also to the number of their formal structures of cooperation and the amount of funds managed in the last periods of community programming, or to the flows of companies and people in the cross-border space. In addition to the sustainability of some of its actors and structures of cooperation, as it is the case of Eixo Atlântico (Domínguez 2008, 13-48) or the recent consolidation of the Euro-City Chaves-Verín through its conversion into a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation in 2014.

This Euro-regional space is especially innovative. It includes good practices of sustainability (Local Agenda 21, implementation of local digital agendas), stimulus of technical management structures of European funds (EGTC, Galicia-North of Portugal) and other local cooperative networks centered in the Euro-region (Eixo Atlântico), besides the rest of initiatives in the whole Spanish-Portuguese border (RIET).

Despite the Euro-regional innovation, we do not find a clear reflection in the social and territorial cohesion of their territories and citizens, or at least not as much as expected after the last three periods of Community programming, especially after the beginning of the INTERREG initiatives, 1990-1993, that invested billions of euros in cross-border cooperation. This seems to be the opinion of the citizens, who hardly perceive the effects of the cross-border cooperation in an increase in the GDP of each of its regions in comparison with the rest of EU regions. Simply because they are unaware of what is the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region (only 3% of Galician people know it, by 8% of the Portuguese). The consequence is that Euro-regions hardly appear in the public debate (with a few exceptions), and if they do they are only a part of the discourse of certain political and administrative elites (when electoral campaigns of the different levels of government take place).

Before summarizing the consequences of the institutionalization of the Euro-regions, at least in the case of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region, we consider that it is essential to differentiate between results (“outputs”) and impacts (“outcomes”). This traditional political distinction implies separating the process of a public policy from its real impact on the targeted collective of citizens. This is a key question to understand the change of course of the European Commis-

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3 This percentage increases when inquiring about their relative knowledge: Q 7: “Have you heard of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region?” The 63% of Galician people claim to have heard of it, only 40% of the Portuguese (Ferreira, Vieira & Domínguez 2012, 365-382).
sion design of cohesion policies for the present period, 2014-2020. Until today, in the general programming of Community funds and cross-border cooperation initiatives, it was fundamental to get candidatures, and ultimately to implement them; focusing the analysis on the process and not on the impact that should have in the improvement of the citizens’ quality of life. But, from the analysis of the last period of Community programming, 2007-2013, the European Commission proposed a change of course, precisely based in multilevel governance; all of this, after a highly critical analysis of the real effects of the cohesion policy on the citizens, affected, without any doubt, by the 2008 financial crisis and the growing political disaffection and euro-skepticism.

Next, we are going to expound as a “policy problem” a case that exemplifies these differences between outputs and outcomes, and that encourages us to propose new theoretical and practical institutions that can help us to understand cross-border governance.

The Cross-Border Mobility as a Euro-regional “Policy Problem”

Within Euro-regional spaces we find a good number of cases, projects, programs and community actions that speak of successes and failures, good technical results and low social impacts; where all of them contribute to the institutionalization or dis-institutionalization of cross-border cooperation.

Because, as we have seen in the previous section, different public policies and many public services show the outputs of the formal and material cooperation, although not its outcomes or at least many of them having to do with improving the citizens’ quality of life and social and territorial cohesion.

This argument can be sustained by analyzing changes in cross-border governance that have taken place, for example, in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euroregion, from some specific “policy problem” within this border area.

Thus, with the purpose of assessing, although in an exploratory way, the consolidation of the Euro-region Galicia-North of Portugal, we will look at the problem of cross-border mobility from the formal-material perspective explained previously. Our starting point on this issue is that this mobility seems to be an unsatisfied need that has to be covered by the public operators and those other that have gained responsibility on its management due to outsourcing processes of policies and public services. In addition, if we choose some of the governmental devices that have been created over the past twenty years in the Euro-region

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4 We understand public problems as the questions considered by the stakeholders as of general interest, that are introduced into the agendas of the different multilevel governments, by the stimulus of public decision-makers (public agenda) or by the pressure of stakeholders for a public policy (systemic agenda).
Galicia-North of Portugal, in both sides, obviously funded by Brussels and the central governments, we find some reasons to think that the outputs have little to do with the outcomes of this mobility policy. Because it is indeed a problem with multiple dimensions, solutions and results, as much in regards to land mobility by road as by plane or train. Furthermore, mobility is a basic element of the different treaties of the European Communities, a universal right in a society so supposedly advanced as the European society.

However, the institutional framework and the reality of the Euro-regional implementation are different issues. We can analyze this implementation through the processes of commercialization of public services and the study of the disaffection of the citizens. Also through the influence that some “styles” of public management (“New Public Management”) have on community services and policies. Styles that have persuaded presidents of governments, ministers, EU Commissioners and even Parliamentary Committees in the European Parliament to consider that the best way to manage borders (up to now areas of public domain) is to leave them in the hands of those who most know about management: the private companies.

Because, although it is true that citizens visit both sides of the Galician-Portuguese border when they pass through any of the bridges that cross the river Miño/Minho, financed by European funds during the last two decades. It is also true that, although cross-border mobility has improved, intra-border mobility has worsened, at least for the populations (Tui-Valença) at both ends of the only bridge that joins Spain and Portugal in the final stretch of the river Miño/Minho in its journey towards the Atlantic Ocean.

In the case of the construction of road infrastructures (freeways and highways), a classic model of formal and material cooperation, the development of alternatives has been monumental. Although with the commercialization of the same and the difficulty to make interoperable systems of electronic payment of tolls (the owners are Spanish and Portuguese banks), the result has not been positive. It created a diplomatic conflict between the two countries and caused the fall of tourist movements from Galicia to the North of Portugal, by the insecurity that produced the Portuguese modality of tolls payment, indeed outsourced to a private company (SCUTS). Only the claims of some mayors of the North of Portugal region to their own government in Lisbon, as well as the pressure exerted by Portuguese associations, got to improve the management of this form of payment. In this issue, the leaders of the process were Eixo Atlântico and RIET, doing an exercise of bottom-up cross-border governance.

With regard to airports, we have an example that is significant of the logic of competition and not of complementariness that central governments of Madrid
and Lisbon have imposed on their cross-border peripheral territories, always with the complicity of their regional multilevel structures (Xunta and CCDR-N). This strategy was clear in the extensions of the regional airports in Galicia and the consolidation of a large international airport in Porto (Sá Carneiro). Thus, Porto has become an international “hub” with direct flights to Latin America and the main “hubs” that have their headquarters in the EU. While Galician airports have dedicated themselves to compete for a regional market (Galicia-Spain), rather than articulating a system of Euro-regional complementariness. The result is that Sá Carneiro has become the international airport of the Euro-region Galicia-North of Portugal by the way of the facts, and without cooperation agreements among Galician local operators, who can see how every year the number of passengers decrease in favor of the Portuguese airport.

A last example to help us to understand the consequences of a poor Euro-regional consolidation, based on competition strategies and not on complementariness, we can find it in land passenger transport by train. In this occasion, we have a model of cross-border mobility, forgotten by public and private institutions. All of this despite the Convention on Oporto-Vigo Railway Connection signed by the Xunta and CCDR-N in 1999. Why do we consider this Atlantic axis so important? Because most of the citizens of the Euro-region are in these 150 kilometers maritime strip, as well as its tourists and business that enter and leave Galicia, Spain, Região Norte and Portugal through its airports. The issue of the railway was included in the Euro-regional agenda through the back door, after not having been able to solve the transport of passengers between the cities of Porto and Vigo within the framework of the Spanish fast lines map. Again, the local actors (Eixo Atlântico and RIET) found a solution to the reduction in displacement of Galician and Portuguese citizens to either side of the border. Before the lack of an alternative to the tolls, they pressured their regional and central governments, raising more economic options to high speed: electrification of the railways, a decrease in number of stops and a continuity in the journey from Vigo to Porto (without changing trains at the border). This solution, called Tren Celta, was included in the XXVI Iberian Summit agenda of cross-border cooperation for the coming years.

In the three examples on cross-border mobility, it is possible to confirm a slight change from the government paradigm to multilevel governance, in the form of a public-private partnership (SCUTS) and the promotion of local networks to be involved in Euro-regional public issues (Eixo Atlântico-RIET). In any case, there is a long way until governance will become a cross-border governance and the Euro-regional actors are able to design joint and complementary policies in which citizens will fit in permanently. Then we will move from technocratic
logics to the democratic ones, from the outputs to the outcomes.

To conclude we address the problem of future analyses on borders in the EU and the new problems and institutions that are taking shape from the merger of the formal-informal, material-immaterial cooperation.

**EPILOGUE: CBC, A “PERFECT STORM,” OR SIMPLY NEW APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF BORDERS?**

The crisis of the post-Westphalian states in the 1970s caused a tsunami on the government structures and on the multilevel administration of their territories. The European Community was part of the solution to this problem. Four decades later, and partly as an effect of a deep financial crisis that has become systemic in the advanced welfare democracies, the tsunami has resulted in a “perfect storm,” but now the EU is part of the problem.

In the case of the Euro-regions, specifically in Galicia-North of Portugal, it has been possible to analyze the evolution of cross-border cooperation institutions and their results in a context of sustained growth of funds and projects. Regional Development and Cohesion Funds, in particular the Community Initiatives, have favored a sustainable model, although incremental, of cross-border cooperation, which has supported the Europeanization of the Members States system and, to a lesser extent, one of regional and local governments.

In fact, this model has increased the complexity of public problems, with the same institutions but with different names and formulas of public management: Euro-regions, European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, Euro-cities; at the same time that private operators have been incorporated to such management, in addition to other sub-central levels of government. In general, citizens were out of these processes of formal and material cooperation, so they have opted to strengthen their traditional processes of interaction through informal and intangible initiatives of cross-border cooperation.

However, the “perfect storm” that has taken place in Europe, and which has left devastating effects in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region, in the form of emigration (especially, youth), increased rates of unemployment and a reduction of the industrial fabric, has also led to a “policy window” for the renewal of the models and the institutions of cross-border cooperation. Thus, in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region the incorporation in the 1990s of *Eixo Atlântico* (local stakeholder) to the Galicia-North of Portugal Working Community (regional stakeholder) created an inertia of interaction that allowed them to cooperate in the creation of the Chaves-Verín Euro-City, in the last decade. In part, because local
and regional agendas have been converging, led from local bottom-up processes, due to the regional inaction at both sides of the border. In this way, *Eixo Atlântico* has positioned itself as a key stakeholder in the definition of public problems that rely on formal and material cooperation processes. How? Practicing the lobbying exercise in the different political centers (Madrid-Lisbon, Santiago de Compostela-Porto and Brussels) and elaborating strategic reports through its Service of Studies and Publications, which legitimized speeches and strategic positions for all the actors in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region.

Thus, it was possible the creation of the RIEI (network) and the impetus of the same to the new strategy of mobility in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region and in all the Spanish-Portuguese “raia” (borderline), which allowed the introduction of mobility as a policy problem in the 2013 Iberian Summit agenda.

Finally, after decades of strategies based on competition, governments analyze the Euro-regional public problems from perspectives of complementariness. Therefore, it is possible that, 20 years after the signing of an International Agreement between Spain and Portugal on the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region, we have a train that connects the main artery of its territory in less than an hour, leaving the 19th century behind definitively.

We do not know yet if this is the general trend of cross-border cooperation in the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region or just a short-term illusion resulting from the need of institutional survival of technocratic elites after the passage of the “perfect storm.” Actually, it looks possible to see how, at least sometimes, formal-material cooperation institutions are in accordance with those others who develop informal-immaterial cooperation for sustainable projects. In any case, and beyond the EU magic date of 2020, we should have a new model in Europe that overflows the states, regions and cities, and puts citizens in the center. If not, we simply have changed everything, so everything remains the same.

These and other questions should lead us to think of new axes of problems or cleavages and renewed approaches to the analysis of cross-border cooperation. To study more pluralist methodologies based on cross-border and polycentric governance (Ostrom 2010, 1-33), to the implementation of management resources of

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5 Already in 2014, they agreed to have a joint action instrument on the subject of Community funds for the current Community programming period: “Plan of Joint Investments of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region (PIC, 2014-2020)”; the first one really of Euro-regional character in Europe. This plan was dealt among the regional governments of Galicia and North of Portugal and the *Eixo Atlântico*, key actors of the Euro-region, who agreed to have a unique strategic document that faces the investments for the whole period of programming community 2014-2020. For the preparation of the final document they consulted other local and managerial actors of both cross-border territories, among others: AECT Vale do Tâmega, CEG, CEP, CEO, Euro-city Chaves-Verin, FEGAMP, AiMinho, ZAS-NET, CIMs do Norte de Portugal.
public and common goods from a perspective of citizen co-production, and not always from approaches to outsource public services to private companies.

Only in this way, citizens, subjects of rights living in metropolitan areas, medium-size cities or small villages may be incorporated to the definition of the Galicia-North of Portugal Euro-region, no longer as a metaphor, but as an institution of government and administration, inside more liquid and virtual environments. Without them, it will be impossible to connect the technocratic logic necessary to organize the complexity, to refresh public policies (“reframing”; Rein 2006, 389-405), to provide legal security and to manage proximity policies and services... At the same time, some citizens who return every summer to their places of origin, as simple tourists, will have the opportunity to become new players in their territory, their culture and their identity; thus, achieving the re-legitimization of these proximity spaces through their daily interactions, as their ancestors have been doing for centuries.

These innovative perspectives should help to transform the cross-border political culture, based on the identity, language and sense of belonging (Douglass 1994, 43-50), of a Euro-region that existed already two thousand years ago (Gallaccia) and should become part of the common political acquis of the men and women who live and want to continue doing so there. The words of Domínguez and Pires (2014, 46) confirm the sense of these reflections:

“Cross-border cooperation and, in general, the process of European construction have, incontestably, brought citizens on both sides of the border closer. But bringing closer does not mean closeness. That is, bringing closer does not imply willingness to share resources and public policies because, despite optimistic messages on the part of Community institutions, cognitive barriers are still present.”

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