UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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RONNIE MAURICE STEWART, et. al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil Action 18-152 (JEB)

SEEMA VERMA, et al.,

Defendants.

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Washington, D.C

Thursday, March 14, 2019

11:00 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES E. BOASBERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, we're here for the second case, 18-152, Ronnie Maurice Stewart, et al., versus Seema Verma, et al.

Counsel, please approach the lecturn and identify yourselves for the record.

THE COURT: We need people to consider it as a separate case. Let's just have counsel do this again.

MR. GERSHENGORN: Good morning, Your Honor, Ian Gershengorn from Jenner and Block for the plaintiffs. With me at counsel table are Jane Perkins, Catherine McKee and Elizabeth Edwards from the National Health Law Program, and Tom Perrelli, Natacha Lam, and Zach Blau from Jenner and Block.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BURNHAM: Good morning, Your Honor. James Burnham from the Department of Justice. With me is Matt Skurnik, Vinita Andrapalliyal and Michelle Bennett.

MR. KUHN: Good morning, Your Honor. Matthew Kuhn for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. With me from Kentucky is Johann Herklotz and Matthew Kleinert.

THE COURT: Okay. You folks at least are new faces for this hour, good morning to you.

All right. I want to conduct this the same way we conducted the last one, Mr. Burnham. So you're up.

MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.

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So in the last argument I started by quoting the delegation to the Secretary. I didn't get to quote and I would like to, just because I think it will frame the next bit of my presentation.

Well, the Senate report that accompanied that provision, and in that Senate report, and I'm sure Your Honor knows this because it's in our briefs, the Senate said that they gave the Secretary this authority so that, quote, "It would not stand in the way of experimental projects designed to test out new ideas and ways of dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients."

And I think that's a really important framing to what we're talking about in Kentucky. Because as we talked about before, we have the expansion population, the Affordable Care Act adds traditional Medicaid. A large population of able-bodied adults.

I think the Court also has to look at this from the Secretary's perspective. We have 50 states. Some of which have not expanded yet. Some of which have expanded, but might de-expand. And, of course, Kentucky has put that into stark relief. So that there's been an estimate, and we quibble with the details of it, but I'll take it as given for now, of 95,000 people maybe losing coverage under the Kentucky reforms. But I think you have to consider that

alongside the possibility of 454,000 people losing coverage because Kentucky decides to discontinue its Medicaid expansion.

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And so just from the perspective of covering as many people as possible, setting aside all the positive benefits that we think could come out of these reforms, that's a pretty easy choice on the part of the Secretary to grant the waiver, continue the expansion and maintain coverage for as many people as possible.

I also think that you have to look at it beyond just Kentucky. So you have 14 states still that have not expanded Medicaid at all. And the idea that these sorts of reforms of linked to states' decisions whether to expand Medicaid, that's not hypothetical at all. So the State of Virginia, just over the river, just expanded Medicaid to cover the expansion population.

In the same legislation that expanded Medicaid to cover the population, the Virginia assembly, which the governor then signed, directed the Virginia Department of Health to seek a waiver from the Secretary to try out the same kinds of reforms that we're talking about today in Kentucky.

That was a political compromise, I assume, in Virginia that we would -- they would expand Medicaid, provided that they could try this kind of an experiment.

think if this sort of thing, if the Secretary's waiver authority were interpreted to not allow this kind of experimentation, that could have, I think almost certainly would have a directly negative effect on states' willingness to maintain coverage for the expansion populations.

THE COURT: So let's talk threshold questions about the expansion population because then I want to get to the fiscal sustainability issue.

So, I mean, you would agree that healthcare coverage, as it relates to the embodiment in 1396(1) is an objective for the expansion population as well as the mandatory population?

MR. BURNHAM: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so you concede that the defendants, the Secretary needed to consider healthcare coverage for this population.

MR. BURNHAM: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So, when you then look at the objectives that the government advances, you sort of talk about health, financial independence and fiscal sustainability. Aren't you ultimately relying on the last year? In other words, we've talked about -- I've talked about anyway in Stewart One, the first health isn't -- that's not, you may disagree, but at the end of the day, isn't the centerpiece of Kentucky Two in this whole case your fiscal

sustainability argument?

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MR. BURNHAM: Yes. And so I think the way I would answer that, Your Honor, is the Secretary reasonably concluded that the reforms Kentucky is testing in its demonstration project could, indeed, are likely to have a positive effect on the fiscal sustainability of Medicaid. But not like the 9th Circuit's decision in Beno where they're just cutting benefits, saving money, and therefore, you know, having more money left. But because they're creating incentives for people who receive Medicaid to go out, earn a living, engage with their communities and reduce the financial burden on Medicaid. And that's a good thing.

That's not a bad thing, because that leaves more money in the Medicaid pot for the people who really need Medicaid. And Kentucky can use that money to give extra services that the Medicaid statute does not require them to provide, vision, dental, things like that, the substance use disorder program that Your Honor is familiar with. And those are all good benefits out of having these kinds of reforms that give people an incentive to go work, and to go and engage in their community. And the reason why those demonstration projects, I think, are coming up now is because of the fundamental way the Affordable Care Act changed Medicaid.

It didn't make sense in 1995 to say that we should

have a, you know, community engagement requirement for a single mother with dependent children or somebody who is frail and unable to work or disabled. But when we're talking about able-bodied adults at, let's call it 120 percent of the poverty line, it does make sense because those are people who, at least some of them, will be able to go out and have gainful employment and end up improving their lives.

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THE COURT: All right. So let me ask you, and this is a central question about financial sustainability. Are you arguing that it's a separate objective of the Medicaid Act from promoting coverage or are you arguing that it itself is part of promoting coverage?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, it's part and parcel, Your

Honor. So, I mean, the way the Court put it in Stewart One

was that the central objective of Medicaid is, quote, helping

the state furnish medical assistance to citizens.

I think financial sustainability is clearly part of that because the fix is not infinite. And so the state's ability to furnish medical assistance depends on the state's ability or willingness because Medicaid is an optional program for the state, particular the expansion portion, well, they both are, but the expansion portion is too, the state's ability and willingness to pay the money to furnish that medical assistance. And so —

THE COURT: So it's part of promoting coverage.

1 MR. BURNHAM: Yes.

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2 THE COURT: That's the argument.

MR. BURNHAM: Yes, yes, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So if that's the case then,
don't we have a problem with limiting principles? In other
words, every time you propose -- Kentucky proposes an
experiment or a state proposes an experiment, then if the
choice, if the answer is, well, it's better than not having
an expansion population, then everything gets approved under
fiscal sustainability, right?

MR. BURNHAM: No, because I don't think -- I don't think my argument is that infinite. I think my argument is narrower than that. It's that this is a legitimate experiment to figure out whether these kinds of reforms can make Medicaid more sustainable without depriving the people who need it of medical assistance.

THE COURT: But what you're -- if what you're saying on the one hand is the expansion population will be cut out entirely, if we can't -- that's what we're going to do if we can't promote this, if we can't pass this reform.

That's the argument, right? Then why isn't that the case?

You could say it about anything. That no matter how deep the cuts are, the answer is, well, but it's better than the expanding.

MR. BURNHAM: So, Your Honor, I think I have a

couple of responses to that. First, that is an argument, that is not the only argument. So my only point with the expansion is that we can't be blind to the reality that if states are unable to experiment with ways to reform Medicaid, the Secretary's unable to allow the states to do the experiments, states may well be disinclined to cover expansion populations. I think that's the whole reason Congress gave the Secretary this very broad waiver authority.

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No, I'm not saying that that means the states can just do whatever they want and that I can always come to you and say, well, you know, they're still going to cover ten people. That's better than them covering zero people. All I'm saying is that that authority is broad, and that you have to consider those consequences in assessing why the authority is as broad as it is.

Now, as far as the program before the Court today, I think the central objective of Medicaid under the Court's analysis in Stewart One is the provision of medical assistance. So what the Court has to figure out is whether the Secretary approved the project that is reasonably approximated toward enhancing the provision of medical assistance.

So cutting off Medicaid for lots of people, a benefit cut like in the 9th Circuit decision in *Beno*, does not have any, A, any experimental value because it's just a

benefit cut, or B, any -- it's not approximated in any way toward the provision of medical assistance. That's not this at all. In an ideal world, no one will lose medical assistance except the people who are -- go out and find work and are able to find employment -- employer provided insurance or purchase insurance under subsidy through the Affordable Care Act exchange.

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And so in an ideal world if these things worked the way they're supposed to work, fewer people may be on Medicaid, but not for a bad reason, not because they've been kicked off, but because they've been lifted out of it.

And so the one decision I would really encourage
Your Honor to take a look at, and the plaintiffs barely talk
about it in their briefs, because they think it's very hard
to distinguish, is the D.C. Circuit's decision in Farmer
versus Thompson. And so as Your Honor, I'm sure knows,
Farmer versus Thompson is a case where basically the state
wanted drug companies to provide cheaper drugs to people who
are low income, but not on Medicaid. And if the drug
companies refused to do that, they've made it harder to get
the drugs through Medicaid. They leveraged Medicaid to get
cheaper drugs for low income people. The D.C. Circuit said
that was fine. The plaintiffs came in and said that was
burdening Medicaid to benefit people not on Medicaid and that
was a problem.

And what the D.C. Circuit said was, and I'm going quote, "It is reasonable to conclude that these populations," meaning the borderline populations, "will maintain or improve their health status and be less likely to become Medicaid eligible," and that's at page 825 of the Court's opinion.

What the Court was saying there, I think, is that you could impose a burden on Medicaid recipients to try to keep other people off of Medicaid. To try to preserve Medicaid for the people who needed it the most. In other words, not have people fall into it.

All we're doing here is the flip. Kentucky is trying to impose some requirements that will help lift people out of Medicaid so that there's more money left in the pot for the people that remain. I think it's the exact same thing.

THE COURT: All right. The argument depends on N.F.I.B., right? In other words, if that comes out the other way, you couldn't say this is coverage promoting.

MR. BURNHAM: No, I disagree, Your Honor. So I think I could still make the same argument I'm making right now because I would still be here saying that because the Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid to a large body of people who can work, that therefore the states have a basis, an experimental basis to try these kinds of reforms.

I think the fact that N.F.I.B. came out as it did

makes my argument very -- much stronger because the states now can now treat the expansion population, I think, as an optional population. I mean, it's separate. N.F.I.B. decoupled it from the traditional Medicaid group.

THE COURT: But if I find that, as I talked about in Stewart, that once the state has expanded that everyone has to be viewed in the same pot, all Medicaid recipients, both the mandatory and expansion population, it seems to me that your fiscal sustainability argument relies on the fact that they're lucky to have Medicaid at all. That the state can do anything they want because — and, I'm sorry, let me take out the preface of the question, the combining the mandatory and expanding because that's not relevant.

The point is that, if the baseline expanded is they're lucky to be in it at all, I'm still not sure why your argument doesn't support the Secretary cutting benefits down to even your hypothetical to ten people.

MR. BURNHAM: Because that's not what happened in the demonstration project here.

THE COURT: But what's, again, what is the limiting principle, I'm saying to you? What you're saying to me is don't worry, that's what happened here was okay, but I'm trying to -- so you've told me all these other states have done it. If those cases come before me, where is the -- where does the line get drawn?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, so I think the line the Court could draw for purposes of this case, which is a line that I think would be fairly easy to enforce, is that the line is the furnishing of medical assistance. So if I come back to you and, you know, some other state and they've decided to cut everybody ages 30 to 50, but they're going to let everybody else in, and I'm telling you that's a good thing, because we still have 30 percent of the population, we could have a conversation about whether the Secretary's broad waiver authority is really that broad. But that's not this.

Kentucky hasn't cut benefits for anyone. All
Kentucky has done is ask people who are able to comply, and
exempt anyone who couldn't reasonably comply, with the
limiting community engagement requirements in order to
continue receiving Medicaid.

THE COURT: You keep saying they haven't cut. But you came -- we won't use the 95,000 as the number that's set in stone. But clearly there is going to be coverage loss for people. You're not contesting that.

MR. BURNHAM: So I think it's totally unknown right now what the effect of these sorts of reforms would be over time.

THE COURT: So you're saying no, the number is not 95,000, it's zero?

MR. BURNHAM: No, I'm not saying that it's 95,000

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or zero. I'm saying that the point of the experiment is to figure out what kind of effect these sorts of reforms have on Medicaid recipients.

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THE COURT: Right, but even if it's half of the 95,000 to say that people aren't going to lose coverage here or that the benefits aren't being cut here, that's only — that's a pretty technical position, isn't it?

MR. BURNHAM: I don't think it's an all technical to say that benefits are not being cut. I mean, it is true that there are some -- I'm sure there will be some people who will choose not to comply with the requirements. And that will then forego Medicaid coverage.

THE COURT: And they will lose benefits.

MR. BURNHAM: They will lose benefits, but that's not because there's a benefit cut, that's because they declined to comply with the new prerequisite for the program. Your Honor, just like someone who's at 120 at the poverty line and doesn't apply to Medicaid in the first place doesn't have Medicaid. So that person doesn't not [sic] have Medicaid because we've cut their benefits, they don't have Medicaid because they never applied for Medicaid in the first place.

And so -- and it can't be that just the possibility of coverage losses invalidated demonstration project because Section 1315 itself explicitly anticipates the possibility of

coverage losses. And that's at 42 U.S.C. 1315(d)(1) where it says that demonstrations may, quote, result in an impact on eligibility.

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THE COURT: But the question then, sure, and that's -- I don't think the plaintiffs are saying, I mean, it's an interesting question, can you ever have coverage loss, and, Mr. Gershengorn, it will be good to hear your response to that. But their answer, I assume is, of course, you can have some coverage loss, but you can't have the substantial coverage loss you have in this case. Why? How can you say that that's not creating a substantial benefits cut, that it ultimately does not create a substantial benefits cut?

MR. BURNHAM: Because I don't think we know what will actually happen until we run the demonstration project.

THE COURT: And so all these commenters are saying are just wrong?

MR. BURNHAM: They don't know. I mean, no state has ever run a demonstration like this one other than the --

THE COURT: Arkansas has. Then we've lost all the -- then 17, 18,000 people have lost.

MR. BURNHAM: I think that's a great example. And I think it would be really useful to see what happens in Arkansas over the next couple of years. In the last argument, we had this kind of the data versus people. It's

not data versus people at all. It's all about people. I mean, it would be useful to see what happens with those people. Some of those people may not have reapplied — it sounds like, according to Mr. Gershengorn, haven't reapplied for Medicaid at all. I don't know why that is.

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It could be because they get healthcare through a spouse, or through some other means, or because they have a job or we just don't know. And so I think the point of these reforms is to make people's lives better. And in Kentucky, you actually have a wider array of things in the program that I think are all tailored in that direction. So the community engagement requirements are the most prominent, the most prominent feature.

But you've also got, you know, you've also got the my rewards account and things like that that are intended to give people an incentive to engage more with their healthcare. And if they do that, they going to be healthier people. And if they're in compliance, community engagement requirements, some of them will earn a living or will earn more money and be able to obtain healthcare through the private market. And I just think that's a great thing. It's also great for the people in Kentucky who remain on Medicaid.

THE COURT: On a fiscal sustainability issue, tell me your position on whether a state has to show financial distress in order to -- could a state simply say, given our

budgetary priorities, we'd rather spend a bunch of this money on schools or a bunch on roads. And so, therefore, we're going to -- we only have this pocket we want to spend on Medicaid. And so we're going to make these cuts.

Is that fine for the Secretary to approve that or does the state need to have some argument that financially it's really, if not willingness, very difficult for them to sustain?

MR. BURNHAM: Just to make sure I understand the question. You're talking about de-expanding when you say these cuts?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. BURNHAM: No, I don't think the state has to make any showing at all. So I think N.F.I.B. was very, very clear on this point, and this is why, like I said earlier, I think we win, even without N.F.I.B., but I think we definitely win with N.F.I.B.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry, how about the hypothetical with not NFIB expanding but where you're doing what you're doing here. In other words, by the work requirement.

MR. BURNHAM: Right. So what we're doing here is not so that Kentucky can go save money for tax cuts or something, it's so that Kentucky can have more money in its Medicaid program for the people who need Medicaid. I mean,

that's the point of this --

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THE COURT: So your argument is they don't need to show any financial distress, they can simply say this is a better use of our Medicaid funds.

MR. BURNHAM: They need to show that the project under this Court's opinion in Stewart will further the provision of medical services. And I think Kentucky has absolutely shown that because what Kentucky is saying is that if we impose these reforms, it's going to save money on some of our healthier, more able-bodied Medicaid population because some of them are going to get jobs and not need Medicaid, which again is a good thing. That is a loss of coverage, but only a loss of coverage because they've gotten better coverage or they're going to be healthier and healthier as it relates to fiscal sustainability.

And so then we can use the money left over for substance use treatment, substance abuse treatment. They can use the money left over for vision, for dental, for better prescription drugs, all these other wonderful things that we can give to the people who need them the most. So I think that's the way I would think about it, Your Honor. The state has to show the program will advance the provision of medical services.

If I could, Your Honor, just real quickly before I sit down.

1 THE COURT: And I have one technical question. 2 me just give you just one technical question, I just want to 3 make sure your position on it. If you don't mind turning to 4 the approval letter, page 6, 6723 in the administrative 5 record? MR. BURNHAM: Just give me one moment. 6 7 THE COURT: Sure. Take your time. 8 You may or may not have the answer to this. I just 9 wanted to check one issue. So it's 6723 --10 MR. BURNHAM: Okay. 11 THE COURT: -- page 6 of the approval letter. 12 There's four bullets there. 13 MR. BURNHAM: Yes. 14 THE COURT: I just wanted to know, is that an 15 exhaustive list of the additional changes or not, if you 16 know? And again, take your time. And if you don't know, I 17 understand. Just in some digging we were doing --18 MR. BURNHAM: I'm probably not going to know off 19 the top of my head. But if you'd like, we can submit 20 something. 21 THE COURT: If you don't mind, just to save us a 22 little digging. 23 MR. BURNHAM: Yeah, we'd be happy to do that, Your 24 Honor.

THE COURT: So that would be fine. And please go

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ahead with your last point.

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MR. BURNHAM: Last point. So I obviously think that we should prevail and that the Court should not vacate the approval. I think if the Court disagrees, relief should be remitted to the named plaintiffs. And we talked about this in our brief. I just want to emphasize two points on that.

This case started as a class action. It was filed, the amended complaint was, as a class action. The plaintiffs have not obtained or sought class certification. They've forfeited the ability to obtain class-wide relief. I think they probably couldn't have obtained class certification because their interests are so divergent from the rest of Kentucky.

As we know, the Kentucky governor has said in an executive order that he's going to end the Medicaid expansion. So I think if the Court is going to grant relief, it should only grant it as to these plaintiffs because there's a lot of people in Kentucky who may very well be happy to comply with the community engagement requirements rather than risk their healthcare altogether through the expansion program ending.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kuhn.

MR. KUHN: May it please the Court.

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Your Honor, I want to start with two aspects of this Court's previous opinion to frame our discussion. The Court's already held that the secretary should receive significant deference in deciding whether to approve Kentucky health, and the Court got very close to going ahead and holding that the Secretary get Chevron deference in interpreting the objectives of Medicaid.

Those two findings narrow this Court's task today considerably. For the time I have, Your Honor, I'd like to address the Court's questions, but focus, if I can, on coverage loss and sustainability as an objective of Medicaid.

Start with coverage loss, Your Honor. Three main points here. One thing that hasn't come up yet today is Section 1115(d)(1), which is part of the Section 1115 statute that specifically envisions that coverage loss could occur under a Section 1115 waiver. So the idea that no coverage loss at all is allowed is rejected, we believe, by Section 1115 itself.

Second point about coverage loss that we have not talked about any today is what Kentucky and the Secretary have done to minimize coverage loss that will occur. So let's say someone loses coverage loss for failing to satisfy the community engagement requirements. They're going to have a chance in the next month to make that up. They're also

going to be able to take the course to reenroll.

Same thing with premiums. Let's say they don't pay premiums for two months. They're going to have an opportunity to come back in early. So the Secretary in Kentucky worked exhaustively to minimize coverage loss. We got broad exemptions, we got good cause exemptions, we got on ramps. All of those things have to be looked at in considering coverage loss.

THE COURT: But this isn't new. In other words, all of these criteria or factors that you talk about, they were considered by the commenters when they estimated the number of coverage, number of people who would lose coverage in Kentucky One, right?

MR. KUHN: So we disagree with that. So let me give you a couple of examples. There were a number of guardrails added after the 95,000 projection, if I can call it that. There were a number of guardrails that were added after that.

Let me mention the two primary ones that I want the Court to focus on. Prior to the 95,000 projection, the idea was that folks who were complying with SNAP and TANF's work requirements, who were complying only were exempt from community engagement. After the 95,000 projection, that was expanded. If you look at our current approved waiver, it includes not only folks who are complying, but folks who are

exempt. So that's an expansion of that exception.

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And let me point the Court to why that matters.

SNAP has some very broad exceptions from its work

requirements, one of which is it excludes everyone over the

age of 50. So someone who's on SNAP who's over the age of 50

is going to be automatically exempt from Kentucky's community

engagement. We are running the numbers currently, you know,

April 1st is our deadline, so I don't have firm data that I

can put into the Court's record. But our initial runs have

shown that that's excluding 30,000 folks alone from community

engagement.

So another SNAP exclusion that is new, SNAP also excludes from their work requirements a parent or other member of a household with responsibility for a dependent child. That's an exception from the SNAP requirement. And that's also then an exception from Kentucky's community engagement requirement. Again, added after the 95,000.

Our data is indicating at this point that that also is independently going to exclude another 30,000 individuals from community engagement. So, Your Honor, that is something that was added after the 95,000. Many of these good cause exceptions were added after the 95,000.

Another exception to community engagement was added was the physician attestation exception. If you're not determined to be medically frail, but you decide you are

medically frail, you go to your doctor, and you get an affidavit or an attestation form from him or her, and you're automatically at that point exempt from community engagement.

So, Your Honor, we had the 95,000 projection, and we can go back and forth on whether that's accurate. But even after that, Kentucky and the Secretary took significant steps to minimize that. And I think that needs to be considered.

THE COURT: But how do I know that the Secretary considered those?

MR. KUHN: Because the exceptions were broadened. If you look, let's talk about SNAP payment. If you look in our application it talks about only excluding those who are meeting the work requirements, and you look at how it's broadened since then.

THE COURT: If you tell me these numbers aren't firm, certainly the Secretary couldn't have considered them, right?

MR. BURNHAM: I think part of our negotiation with the Secretary was broadening these exceptions. You can see they weren't in our initial application. They are in the final revised approval. So I think the Court can take notice of the fact that it changed and that we, in fact, broadened it.

The Secretary said in his November 20th approval,

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he specifically said that guardrails were added after the 95,000. And you can go back through and compare our application to what was ultimately approved. So I think the Secretary absolutely determined that he said he did in his labor.

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The third point I want to make about coverage, and we talked a little bit about it, is you've got to consider the flip side of the coin. Is there going to be coverage loss? Perhaps. But is there going to be enhanced coverage for those who have it? Yes. Kentucky has no obligation to provide dental, has no obligation to provide vision. But the my rewards account's going to allow that.

One thing I want to put in the record is we've been allowed to accumulate my rewards virtual:dollars in advance of this. This shows engagement of our population. Our website currently reports that we have 70 million virtual my rewards dollars ready to be spent on April 1st. This is a significant thing that's going to allow coverage that Kentucky could not otherwise provide, dental, vision, over-the-counter medications, and even fitness related services. This is a huge get for Kentucky's population that's very unhealthy.

You'll recall in my previous argument before this Court, I took the Court through the distressing statistics that we have in Kentucky. We're trying to address that.

One of the other problems we have is that in the first year of expanding Medicaid in Kentucky, less than ten percent of our enrollees actually got preventive care.

That's the biggest predictor of how healthy your population is, and less than ten percent of folks who had this benefit did this. That's why we got this theory, that's why we got this test. We want to come alongside these folks, encourage them to try things out.

Let me point the Court to the affidavit that we put in the record with our summary judgment brief that talked about how in Kentucky our expanded Medicaid numbers have gone down 8.3 percent from December 2017 to December of 2018. And honestly, that's a time -- so it's gone down by 8.3 percent. That's a time that the economy had --

THE COURT: 8.3 million or 8.3 percent?

MR. BURNHAM: 8.3 percent, Your Honor. It's in the affidavit. That's the time of an economic upturn. Imagine what would have happened if we would have had our community engagement requirement at that point in time. As the economy is going, as people are aging out of Medicaid or are incoming out of Medicaid, excuse me, we've got a community engagement program that's going to plug them into their communities. It's going to try to make it stick. It's going to try to keep them out of this permanently thereby preserving Medicaid dollars for those in Kentucky who most need it.

Let me turn to sustainability if the Court has no more question on coverage loss. Sustainability, Your Honor, has to be an objective of Medicaid. It says so in 1396(1). Medical assistance is to be provided, quote, as far as practicable under the conditions in such state. As far as practicable under the conditions in such states. The plaintiffs have absolutely no answer for that line in 1396(1).

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THE COURT: Did the Secretary rely on that?

MR. KUHN: Yes, Your Honor, that language is quoted as the sustainability -- my recollection is, confirm when I sit down, but my recollection is that's specifically quoted in the November 20th approval as the basis for the sustainability rationale.

THE COURT: Because the government's position is, and that's why I asked, this is really part of promoting coverage rather than an independent objective of Medicaid.

MR. KUHN: Your Honor, my recollection is, again, that he quoted that language of 1396(1) in discussing, my recollection could be off, but regardless, I think it has to be considered as part of the objectives, consideration of the objectives of Medicaid.

Your Honor, the plaintiffs in this case have not disputed as a matter of Kentucky law that Governor Bevin's executive order is, in fact, the law of Kentucky. He's the

duly elected chief officer. It's the law of Kentucky at this point. That's undisputed for this record. Instead the plaintiffs, Your Honor, have claimed that there's no budgetary evidence about whether Kentucky can continue absent expanded Medicaid.

Two points in response, Your Honor, about the budgetary evidence in the record. You talked to Mr. Burnham a little bit about this. I agree with Mr. Burnham, the weighing of budgetary priorities, deciding what to fund, what not to fund, where to put scarce state resources, that's Kentucky's prerogative, it's not the plaintiffs' prerogative, it's not the Secretary's prerogative.

THE COURT: But if, in fact, there is an independent objective of the act, then because if you're relying on, as far as practicable language, then don't you have to submit further evidence, not just that the state chose to do this, but that it is impracticable for them to do otherwise?

MR. KUHN: Well, I think that is the Secretary's determination. I think the idea of how to handle competing budget issues is Kentucky's judgment. That's left to its elected leaders. But, Your Honor, even if you think there is a quantum of evidence requirement, I do want to put into the record some of the budgetary issues that we're facing in Kentucky. This is in response to the statements in the

Court's opinion about what is our budget.

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THE COURT: But again, what was in front of the Secretary. And so you tell me this information, again, and I don't -- I'm not being difficult, but there was a number that was wrong last time, at the last oral argument. It's a question of what the Secretary considered. It's not what I think about the budget of Kentucky. And so, why doesn't -- didn't Kentucky have to say to the Secretary, here are our financials, this is why it's impracticable for us to do it so that the Secretary could say you're right, as far as practicable, it's not practicable for Kentucky.

MR. KUHN: Again, I think that is a judgment that is left to Kentucky. I think that is encapsulated in the governor's executive order. It is on the question of law of Kentucky.

Talking about the record, what was before the Secretary, if you look at our waiver application, there was a statement there that said that continuing expanded Medicaid will crowd out other spending for education, for pension obligations. We have one of the highest unfunded liabilities for pensions. It's as high as \$84 billion. So some of those statements were in our initial approval letter.

As Your Honor knows, in 2020, our state share is going to go up again to ten percent. So we're going to have even more Medicaid spending related to this. The current

appropriation in Kentucky was approximately \$1.8 billion
dollars for Medicaid benefits. And that's going to go up.

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To the question about cost savings and the issue from the previous, there was some confusion on that. I do want to note that because our implementation has been delayed, the projection of how much this would save Kentucky is going to change because year one was at a less favorable rate for us. It was six or seven percent. Whereas now we're going to have an extra year at ten percent. So I do apologize for the confusion in the initial argument. But I do want to point the Court that the five years are going to be different than the five years that were considered initially.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks so much. I appreciate your argument again.

MR. KUHN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gershengorn.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$  GERSHENGORN: Good morning again, Your Honor. And may it please the Court.

In Stewart One this Court identified as a glaring problem the agency's failure to address the potential loss of coverage that Kentucky's unprecedented experiment would have accomplished.

This Court remanded to the agency to fully consider the scope of the problem and what the Court got back was an

agency decision that effectively doubled down on the flawed rationale and failed to engage seriously with the coverage issues this Court identified.

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That is no surprise in the aftermath of this

Court's decision, the Secretary said that H.H.S. was, quote

undeterred, and that C.M.S. was going to forge ahead with

what he called, quote, the next generation of transformation

in Medicaid through our efforts to encourage work and other

forms in the community engagement. This wolf comes dressed

as a wolf. They did exactly what they said they were going

to do.

I won't go over for Your Honor the ways, and they just repeated all of the things that they had said before.

They continued to tout health benefits which you called -
THE COURT: Right. I mean, I want to -- let's cut to the chase.

MR. GERSHENGORN: Okay, well, let's cut to the chase. I see three concerns that Your Honor has raised this morning. The question of sustainability, the question of financial distress, and the question of whether the threat of terminating the expansion population is sufficient. And whether a loan or in combination, those are three.

So let me start with the financial distress, which is what Your Honor ended with. I think the answer to that is exactly what was said in your opinion. So what you said in

your opinion was to the extent you're invoking financial collapse, this isn't practicable, we couldn't possibly do it, put in evidence. You suggested what such evidence might look like, budget, revenues, that evidence is now being presented to this Court now for the first time, which, of course, is not where it's supposed to be presented. It's supposed to go to the Secretary.

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I think in general there's reason to be dubious. I hate to add evidence to the record, but if that's what we're doing, Kentucky has by some measures the 21st highest tax burden in the nation. Puts it right in the middle. Could they increase taxes? We'll see.

You know, there are -- the idea that what's going to happen now is that this Court is going to decide in the first instance without any evidence that this is financially impossible, seems dubious.

I will also say that in the context of Medicaid, it seems quite unusual because with the expansion population, which is what we're principally talking about, Congress is paying 94 percent of the budget. These costs are not going away. People's health problems do not disappear. They get shifted to the state.

And so, it seems quite unusual to me or I'll go further and say absurd to me to say that what we're talking about is eliminating a 94 percent contribution by the federal

government in the name of saving budget for Kentucky. But that's just my view. And the Court isn't bound by that.

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The critical point is Your Honor identified the issues for the Secretary. They identified the issues for Kentucky. And they just were not grappled with.

THE COURT: So let's go back to the question I asked Mr. Burnham about fiscal sustainability and whether -- his position was largely that it's a promotion of coverage. And I want to talk about that in a minute. But let's talk first about Mr. Kuhn's position, which is that it's a separate objective of the act because it's incorporated by the "as far as practicable" language.

MR. GERSHENGORN: Right.

THE COURT: Why isn't that right and why shouldn't I rely on Kentucky's decision of what's practicable or not?

MR. GERSHENGORN: Because I think at that point,
Your Honor, this goes back to limiting principles, and you're
going to hear that a lot from me, I think, over the course of
this morning. There isn't — so first of all, I think the
right way to read as far as practicable is we couldn't do
what Congress has asked us to do. And there isn't any
evidence of that in the record.

THE COURT: It goes back to your first point, which is they would have to show in greater detail why it's not practicable, the Secretary.

MR. GERSHENGORN: That's right, Your Honor. And if you don't require that, and it's just Kentucky's say so, then essentially we've written — there's no limiting principle.

We've sort of read that out of the act because, of course, the state is always making choices about schools and police officers and Medicaid recipients. And that's where the budget decisions are made.

And so if you come in and allow them to say short of distress, well, this just isn't practicable for us, that's a standard we're now meeting. That's absolute deference to the state, and it's completely at odds with the idea that the Secretary is supposed to make a decision about whether this project advances anything.

And so I guess I feel like, and again, I'm going to harp on this, and I apologize. There's reason to be skeptical about it in a situation in which they're targeting the expansion population. And that's the one population that Congress is giving the most budget for. Right? Ninety-four percent. And getting all the coverage. Those people need coverage, where they're going to get unpaid services, which the state is going to pick up anyway.

And so I guess there's reason to be dubious. But in any event, I think that at least as far as practicable, has to be read in light of, you know, the need for there to be some limiting principle.

THE COURT: All right. So let's move back to Mr.

Burnham's point, which is it's part of promoting coverage.

And so why can't Kentucky say, look, we're considering all of the people eligible for Medicaid, and we may have to cut some in order to increase benefits. They sort of make two arguments. One is increase the types of benefits, vision, dental, et cetera. And the other is we'll have to de-expand. So, why — take one at a time if you want, why aren't these decisions they can make?

MR. GERSHENGORN: So can I start — let me start with the de-expand because I actually think, again, in terms of what the Secretary actually said in her letter, de-expand is actually the center piece. And if Your Honor thought that wasn't sufficient, that appears like seven or eight times in the answer, I think you would have to send it back because really the core of what the Secretary said was, and you heard it again this morning, is that when you're talking about are we promoting coverage, you have to take into account the throat from Governor Bevin that he's going to pull 450,000 people off.

Okay. So, and the number of responses, you'll be surprised to learn. The first two don't get to the core of Your Honor's position, but I want to get them out there because I actually think they're important.

The first is, we don't think it's at all clear, and

Your Honor says it's not a foregone conclusion that they can de-expand. And so Your Honor is well aware of the -- of the federal arguments.

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I would point to a different part of N.F.I.B. where it was clear what the Chief Justice was concerned about, was this sort of post-acceptance change, and that what he said was Congress is powered to legislate under the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising participating states with post-acceptance or retroactive conditions.

And so what N.F.I.B. was about was not letting the state make that initial choice. I don't think what the Court held that they then can treat it is an optional population, even though the statute makes it a mandatory population.

But be that as it may, that's not the only constraints on the power to de-expand despite what the attorney for Kentucky said, the governor does not make the law in Kentucky, the legislature does, and the legislature in Kentucky, Revenue Statue 205.520 said, "It is the policy of the commonwealth to take advantage of all federal funds that may be available for medical assistance."

It is our position that that would prevent the governor from de-expanding when they could a 94 percent federal contribution for the coverage.

I don't know that Your Honor is going resolve that today, but I just want -- I don't think it's at all clear you

can un-expand.

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The second point, which is smaller, I'm not sure that Your Honor is going to view it this way, but I will point out that this notion of the linkage between the expansion population and these requirements, is not new, right? That was in the first letter.

Now, Your Honor didn't address it expressly, but this is all that the Secretary did in the second piece. And this is clearest on page 14 where he references back to the January letter, is put this out in more detail. But this is not something new.

But let me just get to the heart of it. I do not think that the Court can look to the possibility of withdrawing the expansion population even if you thought it was legal and even if this were something new. And the reason for that is the following:

What the Secretary is supposed to do when he considers the legality of the project is consider the effect of the project, not how other people will react to that. In other words, the Secretary is supposed to say, here is the program Congress enacted and now I am comparing it to the program that Congress enacted with these provisions gone. It's not — it's intrinsic to the — it's not extrinsic to the project. And you can see that in the statutory language. The statutory language directs the Secretary to consider —

just give me one second, Your Honor -- is to consider whether the project is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the relevant subchapter.

And it has to be that way. It has to be how the project will, not how other people react to it because quite honestly, Your Honor, that way madness lies. It seems to me there are two possibilities. The first is that the Secretary just defers and somebody comes in and says, well, I'm going to de-expand, I'm going to take away the expansion population.

Well, if the Secretary just takes that, Your
Honor's opinion is a dead letter, right? What you said was
we have to think about loss of coverage and promotion of
coverage. But if you can only say I can get out of the
expansion or for that matter, Medicaid is voluntary. No
state has to do it. Then the state can just say I'm going to
dump Medicaid if you don't let me cover the blind, if you
don't let me cover these services or those services. That's
a dead letter.

THE COURT: And that's the hypothetical in part that I'm raising to Mr. Burnham. But his response is, well, don't worry about -- you don't need to create a limiting principle here because what the Secretary did with Kentucky is permissible. And so why shouldn't I not worry about how far down the slippery slope we could go, but say look, what

happened here, I have to give deference is appropriate.

MR. GERSHENGORN: Well, because I guess deference to what, Your Honor? There are a couple of different ideas packed into that question. Deference is to whether the Secretary is going to actually de-expand. That's not something the Secretary has any authority, or any wisdom, any more than yours or mine. We're talking, remember, about not a -- we're talking about an executive order to pursue at the end of all appeals, which Your Honor said in X time period, X month, X years, I don't know what it is.

We have an election coming up in Kentucky in the fall. I have no idea who's going to prevail in that election. I have no idea whether, in fact, somebody can pull 450,000 as a political matter in Kentucky. I have no idea whether having given up 94 percent of the federal matching funds, hundreds of millions of dollars, that that's something that the people of Kentucky and the legislative would be happy with. I don't know that, you don't know that, and the Secretary doesn't know that.

And so it seems to me you either have the Secretary making a judgment that he can't possibly make or you take their word for it in which case there is no review at all, and your opinion is a dead letter. And so either one of those, it seems to me, is quite unsatisfying.

You know, again, you look at the -- you look at the

1 reasons why people have gone with this expansion population.

2 I mean, you look at what's happened, that the uninsured in

3 Kentucky have gone from 35 percent to 11 percent. You know,

4 450,000 people now have coverage. You know, this is a good

5 deal. There's a reason why 50 states have adopted Medicaid.

There's a reason why 36 or 37 states have adopted the

7 expansion.

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And so I guess to me the critical point comes back to you cannot justify this program on the basis of the threat that the governor might follow through or some governor might some day follow through on an effort to remove the expansion -- one last -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GERSHENGORN: And the one last point on that, I mean, I just can't help but saying, of course, that the underlying theory here is targeting the expansion population, right? It's the very thing Your Honor said they can't do. The expansion population is the one that's 94 percent reimbursed. The regular population is 71 percent.

Now, I'm not advocating that they terminate anybody elsewhere. But what's really going on, and you heard Mr. Burnham say it, is a disagreement, a view as the Secretary and the administrator have said over and over that Congress has improperly fundamentally transformed Medicaid. But that's Congress's job. Congress can add additional

populations. And so your hostility to that in your view that
somehow those peopler are not as deserving, I just don't
think that's much weight in the analysis.

THE COURT: But then can there be any kind of coverage losses? I mean, when we talk about limiting principles --

MR. GERSHENGORN: Yeah.

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THE COURT: -- their demonstration projects certainly can have some kind of coverage loss, either with people or benefits, I trust you'd agree. So why -- go ahead.

MR. GERSHENGORN: No, no, you finish. I'm sorry, Your Honor, it's a bad habit.

THE COURT: So where are you drawing your lines on permissible coverage losses?

MR. GERSHENGORN: So I think that's a fair question. And I think you and I had a similar colloquy last time. And I guess my sense of that is this: I'd like to just frame a couple of things first.

What we are talking about here before the Court, and this is ducking a little bit your limiting principle, but I'll work my way around it, because I think this is the easy case, right?

What we're talking about here is not just work requirements, right? We are talking about a combination of premiums, which have been shown in even small numbers to

cause lots people time and again to lose coverage. We're talking about the loss of retroactive coverage which again has been shown time and again to create gaps in coverage.

We're talking about lockouts from things like redetermination, and we're talking about work requirements. So we're talking about a massive dislocation.

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This isn't theoretical. I mean, I heard Mr.

Burnham say, well, we don't know if there's going to be coverage loss. But in the record in Kentucky, it's not just that estimate, which, you know, we've talked about, but actually the actual experience in Arkansas is in the record. So whether or not it's in the record in Arkansas, it's in the record in Kentucky too. And there isn't any doubt that those numbers are substantial. And so we're talking about massive coverage loss.

Now, so in terms of what I think about how to approach it. I think there are three things. First, I think at the very least that massive location, dislocation and coverage loss has to be talked about. That's the insight in Stewart One. And I think that drives, that's sufficient to decide this case. You have to discuss and take seriously that coverage loss.

Second, I think that that kind of massive coverage loss would require an extraordinary showing on the other side and can't be shown even remotely in this record.

So, are you going to press me exactly what's massive, is it 20 percent, is it 15 percent, is it 25 percent? Fair questions. I don't think I could answer what the numerical cutoff is. But I can say that 18,000 people off in Arkansas and that 95,000 people off in Kentucky, we should say, like they poked holes in the 95,000, but there are estimates from amici and others which Your Honor has referenced, which are many times higher than that.

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But when you're dealing with that kind of massive dislocation, no, that is not an acceptable experiment, that is not the kind of thing that you can weigh, that you can balance.

And I will say, I mean, I don't won't to diminish any benefit or any person, but the idea that you're kicking thousands and thousands and thousands of people off all coverage so that people can get vision, dental and gym memberships, which is what we're talking about, that's not a serious comparison from my perspective. The loss of coverage is devastating. Congress understood that. Your examples from the legislative history in Stewart One reflected that, right? We're not talking about — and again, I don't mean to minimize vision, which would be very important, but you're talking about comparing that to actual loss of coverage for tens of thousands of people.

So then the third question is, well, what is that

you're saying, Mr. Gershengorn, you can never have coverage loss. I don't think I can say that. I don't think I can say you can never have coverage loss. But what I will say is you have to view that with some skepticism, right? That is the animating future of the act. Your Honor said that in Stewart One, and it was exactly right. Providing coverage is the purpose of Medicaid.

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And so if you are actually taking away coverage, I think that has to be viewed with deep skepticism. And prior waivers have reflected that, right? Prior waivers were to expand coverage, improve delivery of care, experiment with payment methods, right? What's unusual, right, is not — either there was — there was — what's a changed in 2017 is that the Secretary and the administrator have made a, not a secret decision, a public decision which they have trumpeted to transform Medicaid.

THE COURT: But if, and maybe this merges back into the sustainability as a separate objective, but what if there is evidence that a state financially can't support this kind of coverage for all of these folks? Then it's okay or is it never okay?

MR. GERSHENGORN: So, Your Honor, I guess -- here is my view on that. So I think we're a million miles from that. But I guess I will stay with what I think is the right answer and the hard line position, which is no, you cannot

engage in substantial cuts to save the program. And here's why I say that. Like Medicaid is a deal from Congress, right? And what Congress says is we are going to pay a substantial portion of the cost of your people for Kentucky for the regular traditional population of 71 percent, it varies obviously from states, and for the expansion population is currently 94 percent.

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But there is a tradeoff for that, right? It becomes with a package of coverage and benefit requirements. This is not a la carte, right? The Court -- the state is not allowed to say, well, I don't want to cover breast cancer screening, I don't want to cover emergency treatment, I don't want to cover the blind from Your Honor's, you know, Your Honor's hypothetical.

And so, I understand that that's an uncomfortable position. And we and my cocounsel, you know, are advocating for Medicaid rights. That's not something I like to say, but that is the deal from Congress. And so I guess I would say if the state really says we just can't make Medicaid work, and so we want to cut all these people from the roles and cut all these benefits, then the answer is Medicaid isn't for you.

Now, the reason no state has done that despite budget troubles and all the very -- and financial situations of all 50 states goes back to what I said, and I apologize, I

will repeat, which is, it's a good deal for the states, right? Seventy-one percent coverage, 94 percent coverage. Health benefits proven. This is the kind of thing that states realize helps their budget. Does that mean it's free? Of course not, right? It's a partnership, it's a federal/state partnership.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just go to the two last issues. The first, Mr. Kuhn's position that there are these new guardrails which substantially reduce the number of uninsured and that those new guardrails were, in fact, were considered by the Secretary this time around, but not the first time around.

MR. GERSHENGORN: So, I apologize, I'm not going to have as good an answer. My understanding from listening was that those guardrails that were post the 95,000 estimate.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GERSHENGORN: And so that's poking holes in the 95,000 estimate. Your Honor, I'm not wedded to the 95,000 estimate. As I've mentioned to you --

THE COURT: You think it's higher.

MR. GERSHENGORN: -- and I think Your Honor, you know, think it's much higher. But actually the critical thing is, and I think we had Arkansas before it. Again, Arkansas is in the record, and that was, you know, 18,000 people that were kicked off. So, you know, whether you're

talking 95,000, 47,000, that's a huge difference, but I might say, it's way higher. It seems to me neither here nor there for Your Honor's decision.

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THE COURT: All right. And then the last issue is Mr. Burnham's last point regarding relief should be limited to the named plaintiffs.

MR. GERSHENGORN: So I think that, first of all, I think that's completely inconsistent with what Your Honor said in — what Your Honor did in Stewart where you did not allow the program to go forward for all but the 16 named plaintiffs. I also think it's inconsistent with D.C. Circuit precedent. The idea is that an APA challenge, and you challenge the rule under the APA, the result is that the rule is vacated.

Now, I recognize there's a good deal of controversy and discussion, which I saw first hand about the appropriateness of injunctive relief beyond the plaintiffs.

I don't think, respectfully, that that's what is at issue here where there's an APA violation. If there were constitutional violations, someone coming in and challenging the government program on constitutional grounds, then there may be arguments about the appropriateness of nationwide injunctions extending beyond the plaintiffs, et cetera.

But in an APA case, where the challenge is to the rule, the APA says, and I think the D.C. Circuit has

repeatedly and, indeed, this Court did in Stewart, come to the same place, which is that you vacate the rule, not just the rule as it applies to the 16 people.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. GERSHENGORN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Burnham, last word.

And why don't we just start there. Why isn't what you're asking me to do here on the relief, if we get to that point, contradicted by what I did in Stewart One? In other words, as Mr. Gershengorn just said.

MR. BURNHAM: So I don't believe this issue was teed up really in Stewart One. And so I don't think Your Honor had to pass on the argument that I'm making today, which is that we believe it needs to be limited to the plaintiffs. Actually I haven't look at those briefs in a little while, but I don't believe we presented the issue to the Court then.

THE COURT: Yeah, and I actually, I don't -
MR. BURNHAM: And so I don't think it's been passed

upon. I think it's an open issue for the Court in this

round. And I do think, you know, there is plenty of

precedent out there for courts limiting relief even in APA

cases to the plaintiffs before the Court. We cite some cases

in our brief. The one that I'll give Your Honor right now is

a 9th Circuit case called Los Angeles Haven Hospice,

Incorporated versus Sebelius, that's at 638 F.3d 644. And I just think as a matter of your equitable discretion, the states in Kentucky with the possible de-expansion make clear why relief should be so limited.

If I may, Your Honor, I just had four really quick points I wanted to make in response to Mr. Gershengorn's presentation.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. BURNHAM: So first, Mr. Gershengorn points out that Medicaid is not an a la carte program, that's true. But that's why Congress gave the secretary 1315 waiver authority. What Congress said when they did it was that they didn't want the federal requirements to stand in the way of experimental projects. And so that's why, even though it's not an a la carte program, the Secretary has the authority to approve demonstration projects like the one before the Court today.

Now, on the rationale, I think this got a little bit confused between the various presentations. I'd like to just read Your Honor a somewhat long sentence from the approval letter that I think ties together what I was saying and what Mr. Kuhn was saying.

THE COURT: All right. With moderate speed.

MR. BURNHAM: Yes, Your Honor, I'm sorry. And this is at 6719 of the administrative record.

"Section 1115 demonstration projects also provide

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an opportunity for states to test policies that ensure the fiscal sustainability of the Medicaid program, better enabling each state as far as practicable under the conditions in such state to furnish medical assistance.

Section 1901, while making it more practicable for states to furnish medical assistance to a broader range of persons in need."

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And so I think the rationales are so intertwined it's kind of hard to disentangle them.

THE COURT: Well, again, as I'm pondering this opinion, and my question is am I — are these independent arguments that you're raising that you can win on either to prevail. And so, it seemed to me that in your earlier argument you were arguing that it was really promoting coverage. Mr. Kuhn was arguing the other. I mean, if you're arguing both, then I'm happy to address both.

MR. BURNHAM: Yes, I think we're advancing both.

My point was that conceptually I don't know that there's much difference.

And then so Mr. Gershengorn made a point about how subsidized coverages and the exchanges, the 94 percent number, not to be a quibbler, three percent this year, and then it actually goes down to 90 percent in 2020. So the financial burden on the states recovering the expansion population is real. It is a substantial amount of money in

the state budgets. And C.M.S.'s view, and I think this is clearly the correct view, the state does not have to justify to C.M.S. whether it can afford to or to not participate in Medicaid.

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So when Kentucky comes to C.M.S. and says we're going to de-expand if we're not allowed to run an experiment that we think and maybe you think falls within the heart of your 1315 waiver authority, C.M.S. doesn't have the authority after -- particularly after N.F.I.B., to require the state to make a budget presentation about its tax rate and about its education funding and about whether, you know, it could cut --

THE COURT: So you're saying that C.M.S. simply has to entirely defer to a state that says it's not practicable for to us do this?

MR. BURNHAM: So on the de-expansion point, I think that answer is yes. I think on the rationale for approving this, no, but I think what happened in the project here is C.M.S. looked at the project and said this will enhance coverage for everybody because if it works the way that it's supposed to work, people will leave Medicaid, but they'll leave Medicaid for good reasons.

THE COURT: But I guess, again, as I'm trying to address this, your point there seems to be returning to where you were in your initial argument, which is that we're not

really pressing this as far as practicable because if that, if financial sustainability is the independent objective of the act that relies on the "as far as practicable" language seems to me that the state has to make some showing that it's not practicable as opposed to your argument earlier in which I agree, they don't need to make that showing.

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MR. BURNHAM: So, I think that the Secretary's rationale was, the only way Kentucky could afford to maintain its expansion is by implementing these reforms, then that would be what Your Honor has just hypothesized. That's not this. And so that — we're not relying on that rationale then in that sense. What I think we're relying on is Kentucky has come and said, look, here's an experiment we want to run where we think we can get better care for less money.

THE COURT: That it promotes coverage.

MR. BURNHAM: Correct, yes, yes.

THE COURT: So again, so that's what I'm saying. I think that you're back to arguing that that's really your central thesis, which is not the independent basis, but that it's part and parcel promoting coverage.

MR. BURNHAM: In this project, yes, I don't want to -- yes, I think, Your Honor, I think we're on the same page.

And then so I'm on my third of the four points. So

the other point I wanted to make on de-expansion issue. It's not just that that's what I think is clearly the consequence of N.F.I.B. That's also what C.M.S. told the states when they expanded.

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Secretary sent to Arkansas that said you can de-expand or expand at your discretion. And so I just don't think there's any real question that if Kentucky -- you know, the plaintiffs apparently have a disagreement with the governor about what Kentucky law provides, the federal government hasn't taken a position on that, but if the state wants to de-expand, there's nothing that we can do to stop them.

And I do think while it is true that under the terms of the Affordable Care Act the populations are the same, but the state is entitled as a matter of its own discretion, I think, to say that we're going to prioritize the traditional Medicaid population over the expansion population, I mean, there's a reason —

THE COURT: So you're saying they could give certain benefits to the mandatory population and not the expansion population?

MR. BURNHAM: No, that wasn't quite what I meant. What I meant was that as a matter of whether it expands or not or whether it maintains the expansion or not, that is a policy choice the state can make. I don't think that the

1 state can --2 THE COURT: Can discriminate within the two --3 MR. BURNHAM: Correct. I don't think they can say 4 cancer coverage for the traditional, not for the expansion. 5 THE COURT: Right. 6 What they can do, I think, is try MR. BURNHAM: 7 things like what they're doing here, the community engagement 8 requirements, that generally make the most sense as applied 9 to the expansion population. 10 And then the final point I wanted to make is just 11 that I think this is exactly the kind of project that 1315 12 exists to allow the Secretary to allow the states to conduct. 13 It's a way to figure out whether there's a way to provide 14 better care for the people who need Medicaid, for less money 15 in a way that's going to make the program more sustainable. 16 And it's the Affordable Care Act itself that created the 17 conditions that gave rise to, sort of the population where 18 this kind of an experiment makes sense. And so I would 19 encourage Your Honor to not vacate their approval. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 Your Honor, can I just add one more MR. KUHN: 22 thing? 2.3 THE COURT: You may. 24 I don't want to -- the question you MR. KUHN:

asked of Mr. Gershengorn about when the SNAP TANF payment,

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expansion came in, my point is not that it came in after

Stewart One, my point is it came in after the 95,000.

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THE COURT: Okay. And that was not clear to me. So thank you very much for correcting that.

MR. KUHN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So here's -- first of all, thank you all counsel in both cases for all of your able work. It doesn't make my job any easier, but I appreciate your sophisticated and thoughtful submissions and arguments today.

So, just as with Stewart One, that I thought it was imperative to get out an opinion before the program went into effect, just on -- for disruption reasons, I plan to do so if at all possible with this as well.

And my plan, not a broad oath, but my plan is to issue the opinion simultaneously because as we talked about in Arkansas there is certainly some overlap, and then some — that how I ultimately rule on Stewart can arguably affect the outcome in Arkansas. So my hope is to issue both of these by the end of the month.

And so any -- so I know on that one issue, Mr.

Burnham, you're going to get something back to me, the

sooner, the better on that. And again, I will hope to have

these. And then we'll go from there. All right?

So thank you all very much. I appreciate it.

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                (Court recessed at 12:15 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Lisa Walker Griffith, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Lisa Walker Griffith, RPR

4 - 4 - 19

Date