

COMMENT LOG

Originating Office: SEA-AEG	Document Title / Description: B-737 FSB REPORT REV 17	POC & Phone Number: Aaron Perkins (206) 231-3909	Suspense Date: 04-30-2019
--	--	---	---

Commenter Name & Organization	Date	Page #	Line, Para or Item #	Comment	Recommendation	Response
Donald V. Watkins (dvw@donaldwatkins.com), former Cessna Citation jet owner, and passenger in 2018 on two 737 MAX aircraft operated by Southwest Airlines.	4-17-19	1		The Aviation Evaluation Division of the FAA's Transport Aircraft Seattle Branch approved this draft FSB Report (Rev. 17). The Boeing 737 MAX aircraft is manufactured in Renton, Washington. The Seattle Branch's AEG conducted an analysis of the original MCAS flight control system in 737 MAX aircraft and found the airplane to be "operationally suitable" even though the MCAS contained major flaws in its software design and operational performance. This FAA error in judgment contributed to two crashes of 373 MAX airplanes that killed 346 passengers and crew members. The FAA's Transport Aircraft Seattle Branch has a genuine conflict of interest in participating in the preparation and/or approval of this FSB/Operational Suitability Report.	A disinterested FAA Transport Aircraft Evaluation Division should perform this "operational suitability" review, particularly since the same rush to certify the 737 MAX in 2016 is present again. No person who participated in the initial 737 MAX certification process should be a participant in this evaluation and certification process. The fact that a federal grand jury is reviewing the initial FAA certification process for the 737 MAX series of aircraft undermines the credibility of any subsequent analysis and review by participants who were involved in the original aircraft certification process. The temptation to use the current review process as an opportunity to cover-up critical mistakes in the initial certification review is simply too great to be trustworthy.	
		1-57		The same rush that led to the FAA's certification of the 737 MAX series of aircraft with a defective MCAS flight control system is being repeated with this FSB/OSR and with the abbreviated period for comments. Why would the FAA implement an abbreviated comment period for Boeing's proposed modification to a defective aircraft system that killed 346 passengers and crew members on two 737 MAX airplanes? It is apparent that the FAA's Transport Aircraft Seattle Branch is a "captive" government agency of The Boeing Company. The FAA's rush to complete the	Because the 737 MAX aircraft and MCAS flight control system have a documented history of crashing planes and because the initial certification of the aircraft and MCAS contributed to the death of 346 passengers and crew members, the FAA's evaluation of the MCAS modifications and certain corrective actions proposed by Boeing must be more thorough than it was when the initial certification of the aircraft and MCAS occurred. Otherwise the FAA is simply repeating the same error in judgment that killed 346 people on the Lion Air and Ethiopian Air 737 MAX airplanes.	

COMMENT LOG

Originating Office: SEA-AEG	Document Title / Description: B-737 FSB REPORT REV 17	POC & Phone Number: Aaron Perkins (206) 231-3909	Suspense Date: 04-30-2019
--	--	---	----------------------------------

Committer Name & Organization	Date	Page #	Line, Para or Item #	Comment	Recommendation	Response
				certification review process on the proposed modification of the 737 MAX series of aircraft has more to do with Boeing's profitability than passenger and crew safety.		
		1-57		Boeing's decision to (a) place larger engines on the 737 MAX aircraft and (b) move these engines closer to the front of the airplane was a design flaw. It caused the airplane's nose to pitch up under certain conditions. The FAA was aware of this design flaw. However, Boeing convinced the FAA that the MCAS flight control system would correct this permanent design flaw. Without adequately and independently verifying the functionality of the MCAS, the FAA approved this software fix for a permanent design flaw in the 737 MAX. The draft FSB/OSR sanctions and perpetuates the original aircraft engineering design flaw and computer solution to this built-in defect. This proposed certification action is unprecedented in FAA history and demonstrates a reckless disregard for the lives and safety of passengers and crew members on 737 MAX aircraft.	The FAA should rescind its airworthiness and flight safety approvals for the 737 MAX series of aircraft, as currently designed. No responsible government agency or official should approve an aircraft design that has a built-in engineering flaw due to the size and placement of aircraft's engines. The 737 MAX series of aircraft should be redesigned to make them safe to fly without the necessity of a MCAS flight control system.	
		4 and 22		In March 2019, the FSB conducted an "evaluation" of the MCAS and found it to be "operationally suitable." The FSB did not recommend that the built-in design flaw with the 737 MAX's engines be fixed. Instead, the FSB/OSR continues to sanction the manufacturer's design flaw, with the	The FAA should permanently rescind its airworthiness and flight safety certifications the 737 MAX series of aircraft, as currently designed. No responsible government agency or official should approve an aircraft design that has a built-in flaw due to the size and placement of the aircraft's engines. The 737 MAX series of aircraft should be redesigned to make them safe to fly without	

COMMENT LOG

Originating Office: SEA-AEG	Document Title / Description: B-737 FSB REPORT REV 17	POC & Phone Number: Aaron Perkins (206) 231-3909	Suspense Date: 04-30-2019
--	--	---	---

Committer Name & Organization	Date	Page #	Line, Para or Item #	Comment	Recommendation	Response