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# SECTION LEADING IN ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

1923

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A guide for the Training of Non-Commissioned  
Officers as Leaders of Infantry Sections.



LONDON

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
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## INTRODUCTION.

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1. The experience of fighting with and against modern weapons has led to a modification of the infantry battle formations. Long lines of men, with intervals between the men, have been superseded by small groups of men with wide gaps between the groups. These groups are the infantry sections. The normal interval between groups will probably be somewhere between 100 to 200 yards.

2. Such fighting formation obviously indicates that the leaders of these small groups have far greater scope for the exercise of tactical initiative than was given to the section leaders under former conditions.

No matter how cut-and-dried the detailed instructions issued beforehand for any plan of action may be, the time will come sooner or later when the section leaders are required to act on their own initiative and judgment.

The success of any operation will depend to a large extent on this initiative and judgment producing the action which will best assist the plan of the higher commander as a whole.

This can only be obtained by each section being led by a leader who has both the necessary knowledge and the ability to apply it intelligently, when he can get no further guidance from his superior, and has to act on his own.

This knowledge and ability can only be acquired by training, and the object of this pamphlet is to give a guide to those who are conducting the education of those about to become section leaders.

3. Officers responsible for this training must on no account confine their instruction to the exercises mentioned in this pamphlet, but must supplement them by personally conducted exercises suitable to the mentality of the pupils, thereby further driving home the knowledge which is being imparted.

4. **The Pupil.**—The pamphlet is written on the assumption that the pupil is either the recently appointed lance-corporal, or the private soldier selected as understudy to the section leader.

5. **Scope of the Training.**—The scope of section leader training, as dealt with in this pamphlet, is confined to instruction in those subjects which the section commander requires to know for his own use in battle.

Instructional criticism of any training exercise, whether it be praise or censure, must fix the responsibility for the action either to the leader or the led.

6. **Administrative Knowledge.**—The important duties which may be classified under this heading are not included in this pamphlet. It is, however, presumed that this side of training will have preceded or will run concurrently with section leader battle training.

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## CHAPTER I.

### CHARACTER.

1. "The development of the necessary moral qualities is the first object to be attained in the training of an Army." F.S.R., Section I, 2.

2. No great or even mediocre military leader has ever existed who did not possess what is described as "character." The meaning of the term "character" is not easily defined with exactness, but the various ingredients which go to make up "force of character" should be explained to the prospective section leaders on the following lines, in simple language.

3. The chief qualities that go to make up character are :—

- i. Unselfishness.
- ii. Loyalty.
- iii. Determination.

4. **Unselfishness** implies subordination of self to consideration for others : playing for your side rather than for yourself. In all places, under all conditions, it implies a knowledge of human nature and tact. It should not in any way run counter to discipline, which is maintained by good example, rather than by punishment. The brave man is always unselfish.

5. **Loyalty** in its widest sense means loyalty not only to the King, country, army, regiment, or cause, but also to the

wishes, orders, and teaching of the immediate superior. The terms "quite straight" or "playing the game" are implied in the term "loyalty."

6. **Determination** means "seeing a thing through," once the plan has been decided upon, no matter what opposition is met with. Go on trying—it is akin to stout-heartedness and the fighting spirit, and requires constant effort of will. Every obstacle overcome by the individual definitely increases that individual's powers of determination.

7. Simple, concrete examples drawn from episodes in war or peace should be related in explanation.

8. After tactful and suitable explanation of the above, the section commander should have clearly in his head something like this :—

I must play up for my section, and be sympathetic to the men under my command, set a good example, and maintain discipline firmly.

I must go on trying and never give up.

I must "play the game"—by my regiment, by my company, by my platoon commander, and by my platoon sergeant.

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## CHAPTER II.

### SYLLABUS.

1. The syllabus of section leader training may be divided under two headings :—

- i. Instruction in the three principal duties of a section leader in battle, each subject to be taken separately.
- ii. Instruction in the correct combination and application of these subjects.

2. The three principal duties of a section leader may be said to be his possession of a thorough knowledge of :—

- i. The employment of the section weapons.
- ii. Use of ground.
- iii. Adoption of suitable formations.

It is essential that every pupil under instruction as a section leader clearly understands the distinction between the private soldier's knowledge of these subjects, and the fuller knowledge necessary for the section leader.

#### *Weapons—*

The private soldier requires to be skilled in handling or serving the weapon in conformity with the instructions of the leader.  
(Fire discipline.)

The leader decides when the weapon will be used, the intensity of its use, the place from which it will be used, and the target against which it will be used. (Fire control.)

*Ground—*

The private soldier makes use of the ground he is told to occupy or move over.	The leader selects the ground to be occupied or the line of movement.
--	---

*Formations—*

The private soldier is required to know and take up his correct position in any formation ordered.	The leader decides which formation shall be adopted, and orders it accordingly.
--	---

On the assumption that the pupil has been trained in the private soldier's aspect of these subjects, the following chapters deal with the amplification of the knowledge of them to meet the requirements of the section leader.

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## CHAPTER III.

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### WEAPONS.

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1. The weapons which may be under the control of a section commander are :—

Rifle.  
Bayonet.  
Lewis Gun.  
Grenades, Rifle H.E.  
„ Rifle Smoke.  
„ Hand H.E.  
Revolver.

2. The section leader, in addition to the knowledge he requires for developing the skill of his men in the handling of these weapons, requires further knowledge to enable him to exercise skill in his own rôle as director of this group of weapons.

3. His skill in this direction is exercised in recognising the conditions which offer the suitable opportunity for the employment of any particular weapon, and, having come to a decision, in getting it effectively employed without delay.

#### 4. The foundation of his education in this subject—

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>comprises</p> <p>i. Knowledge of the powers and limitations of each weapon, and the conditions under which each can be used to the greatest advantage.</p> | <p>and can be developed by</p> <p>i. Lectures on the characteristics of each weapon (supplemented by practical demonstrations) illustrating especially—</p> |
|---|---|

(a) The range limits.

(b) The rates of fire.

(c) How fire effect is influenced by:—

The type of target.

The shape of the ground.

The trajectory.

Atmospheric conditions.

ii. The ammunition supply.

ii. *Lectures—*

The amount of ammunition for each weapon carried by the section and individual. The place where the next supply comes from, and the means of obtaining it.

iii. The methods by which to control fire.

iii. *Training in—*

Indication of targets or aiming marks.

Judging distance.

Fire orders.

Application of fire.

Observation of fire.

Range cards.

iv. A general knowledge of the support he can expect from the fire of weapons not contained within the platoon.

iv. Lectures and demonstrations illustrating the co-operation of other arms with infantry.

5. The following paragraphs concerning the employment of the weapons should form the basis of lectures and demonstrations to classes of section leaders.

6. **The Bayonet.**—The bayonet is the weapon for close combat. The main use of the fire of all the other weapons is to pave the way for the infantry to get to close quarters with the enemy and use the bayonet.

The ambition of every section leader should be to lead his section into the hostile position, and fight the enemy with the bayonet.

The mere threat of the bayonet, in the hands of men known to be skilled in their use, is often the breaking point of the enemy's morale.

## 7. **The Rifle.**

i. *Range Limits.*—The bullet fired from the rifle will travel nearly two miles, but its effective use for practical purposes

is limited to within such distance as the firer is able to fire it with accuracy.

Beyond 1,400 yards the fire of even well-controlled units of riflemen seldom has much effect, and only very exceptional circumstances, such as a considerable number of the enemy grouped in a vulnerable formation, would justify its use beyond that range.

Between 1,400 and 600 yards little result can be expected from individual fire of average men, but carefully controlled collective fire may be expected to produce effective results at those ranges.

Within 600 yards, although carefully controlled collective fire will produce the best results, individual fire, when control is no longer possible, should also obtain good effect, provided the firers have been well trained.

ii. *Rate of Fire.*—The rate of fire, consistent with accuracy, depends on the degree to which the firers have been trained.

At normal rate, the man should be able to fire at the rate of 5 carefully aimed shots a minute ; at rapid rate, 15 aimed shots a minute.

## 8. The Lewis Gun.

i. *Range Limits.*—The Lewis gun is, in itself, a form of collective rifle fire in the hands of one man.

Up to 600 yards a very high degree of accuracy can be expected from its fire.

Between 600 and 1,400 yards, although the gun will fire with great accuracy, such factors as inability to see clearly the aiming mark, errors in judging the exact distance, or estimating the correct allowance to make for wind, added to

the difficulty of getting good observation of fire, minimise the chances of getting effect against small targets.

Beyond 1,400 yards, unless circumstances are very favourable, it is doubtful whether compensating value would be gained for the ammunition expended.

ii. *Rate of Fire*.—Taking into account time for changing magazines and relaying aim between short bursts of fire, an average firer should be able to fire 150 well-aimed shots in a minute. This high rate of fire does not necessarily produce the best effect, as short bursts of fire, with long pauses between them, are often more disconcerting to the morale of the enemy.

At the same time ammunition is economised.

#### 9. Considerations affecting Rifle and Lewis Gun Fire

i. *Rapid Fire*.—Rapid fire should be used as the exception rather than the rule, owing to the expenditure of ammunition entailed. Section leaders should be taught to regard it as a reserve of fire power, to be used in emergency or critical situations, or as a means of reaping full effect from surprise, or when a favourable opportunity justifies the expenditure of ammunition.

ii. *Application of Fire*.—Whereas it is desirable that every bullet should be fired with the object of actually hitting one of the enemy, circumstances, such as the enemy having good cover, the difficulty of discovering the exact aiming mark, the difficulty of locating the exact position of any enemy individual in the area known to be occupied, will necessitate expenditure of ammunition, on the principle of covering the occupied area with bullets in such a manner that wherever the enemy

personnel may happen to be within that area, they will be in the path of one or other of the bullets fired.

The successful application of fire on this principle demands a knowledge of dimensions of cones and beaten zones, of collective rifle and Lewis gun fire, and how the dimensions of the beaten zones are affected by the shape of the ground, in relation to the trajectory of the bullet.

10. Instruction in this subject should take the form of lectures on the theory of collective rifle and light automatic fire (Small Arms Training, Chapter II.), explained with the aid of diagrams, followed by demonstrations with ball ammunition, to show the areas of ground struck by bullets. False impressions will be given unless such demonstrations include both ground horizontal to the line of fire, and ground sloping at various angles to the line of fire.

11. Targets representing groups of enemy, in various formations, should be used to point out degrees of vulnerability of the different formations, in relation to the shape of the beaten zone. The cones of fire are best shown by demonstrations with tracer ammunition.

**12. The Rifle Grenade.**—The rifle grenade (high explosive or smoke) can be fired at a maximum range of 210 yards, and a minimum range of 80 yards. The grenade travels on a high trajectory, and falls at a steep angle.

The high explosive grenade is, therefore, suitable for searching behind steep cover, and forcing the enemy out into the open, where the rifle and Lewis gun can gain fire effect.

The smoke grenade forms a dense screen of smoke, behind which movement can take place unseen by the enemy.

The area covered by the smoke depends on the wind. Normally the screen remains dense for about 30 seconds; consequently advantage can only be derived from it if the forward movement starts simultaneously with the bursting of the grenade.

Owing to weight, the number of grenades which can be carried by a section is strictly limited; consequently H.E. grenades should only be used when other means of dislodging the enemy are obviously impracticable. Smoke grenades must only be used as indicated by the platoon commander in his plan of action, or in accordance with any subsequent orders issued by him.

**13. The Hand Grenade.**—The hand grenade is so limited in its range by the powers of the thrower that, if used in the open, the thrower himself is in the danger area. Consequently, it must be regarded merely as a means of dislodging or destroying the enemy in cramped fighting, such as house to house or trench fighting.

**14. The Revolver.**—The revolver is the personal weapon of the Nos. 1 of Lewis gun sections, for close quarter fighting.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

1. The amount of ammunition carried by a section in action is subject to special orders to meet the needs of any particular operation. There is, however, a normal scale which will be carried unless special orders are given to vary the amount.

i. *Rifle section—*

S.A.A. ·303.—The leader and men of a rifle section each carry 70 rounds of S.A.A. in their pouches. This will be supplemented, prior to going into action, by the addition of 50 rounds carried in the bandolier.

Grenades	{	Cup dischargers ...	3	} Distributed among section.*
		Grenades, Smoke...	6	
		Grenades, H.E. ...	6	

ii. *Lewis gun section—*

S.A.A. ·303.—The normal amount carried by a section, consisting of a leader and 6 men, for mobile operations is 20 magazines, containing 47 rounds each = 940 rounds for the Lewis gun. For rifles, all except the No. 1 carry 50 rounds in chargers.

Pistol ammunition.—No. 1 carries 36 rounds pistol ammunition.

2. The first supply for the replenishment of ammunition will normally be obtained as follows:—

- i. S.A.A. ·303 from the company pack animals and the Lewis gun limber.

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\* *The method of carriage has not yet been decided.*



ii. Grenades from the grenade limber, with first line transport.

iii. Pistol ammunition from the S.A.A. limber, with first line transport.

3. Sometimes, when tanks are co-operating, arrangements may be made for them to carry ammunition to hand over to the infantry during an action. Aeroplanes, dropping ammunition, are also a possible means of supply.

4. In certain phases of warfare, when operations are of a deliberate nature, a means of ammunition supply is the formation of small ammunition dumps in positions handy for the supply of the forward units.

5. The principle of ammunition supply is : (a) that it should readily be forthcoming on demand, and (b) that it should be sent forward, and no man engaged in action should be allowed to go back to obtain it.

A section commander will inform his platoon commander of his requirements, so that arrangements can be made to have it sent up to the section.

## **6. Training in the Methods by which Fire is Controlled.**

i. The section leader employs the weapons of his section by giving his instructions to the men in the form of what are termed "Fire control orders."

The fire control order is merely the leader's instructions, condensed into a concise form which will readily be understood by every man of his fire unit.

ii. The leader, in his training as a private soldier, will have acquired a degree of knowledge of some of the ingredients which go towards the building up of a "Fire control order,"

such as "The Military Vocabulary" (*see* Small Arms Training), visual training and judging distance, but whereas as a private soldier he was taught to understand and act on the instructions contained in a fire order, he now, as a leader, is required, firstly, to decide for himself the range, aiming mark, number of rounds, and rate of fire he wants to use, and secondly, to convey his decisions to the men of the section in the form of a concise fire order.

iii. For the training of section leaders the subject should be divided into :—

(a) The parts of the subject separately :—

- (1) The sequence of a fire order.
- (2) The different kinds of fire orders.
- (3) Judging distance; with the special object of increasing his powers of judging distances up to 1,400 yards.
- (4) Indication.
- (5) The principles governing the application of fire.
- (6) The preparation of range cards.

(b) Practice in giving fire orders, using both landscape targets and open country. This should start with simple straightforward fire orders, progressing by degrees to problems including imaginary battle situations.

(c) Testing in giving fire orders and observation of fire on the field firing range.

iv. The instructions dealing with these subjects are set out in Small Arms Training and are repeated in the next chapter for easy reference.

## CHAPTER V.

### INDICATION OF TARGETS. APPLICATION OF FIRE. FIRE CONTROL ORDERS. RANGE CARDS.

*(Extracts from Small Arms Training.)*

#### A.—TRAINING OF THE LEADER IN INDICATION.

1. **General Remarks.**—It is estimated that 75 per cent. of shots on the battlefield are probably wasted owing to bad indication and recognition.

2. In teaching indication, a reference point, or points, with ranges to each, will always be given.

3. Aiming points will be described whenever possible by the direct method, *i.e.*, without aids. If aids are used, the reference point will always be named before the description of the aiming point.

4. To ensure uniformity, one system of indication is imperative throughout the army.

5. Supplementary methods, known respectively as the vertical clock ray and degree methods, may be used in connection with reference points.

#### INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES.

*(Taught in Stages.)*

##### 1. 1st Stage.

Description of aiming points, without aids. "Direct," or normal method, using (a) or (b) as required :—

- i. Indication by description of any obvious target.
- ii. Indication by direction, *e.g.*, slightly, quarter, half, three-quarter, right or left from either  
(a) Last target, or

- (b) General direction in which men are moving or facing, ending up with description of target in each case.

Kit required :—One aiming rest per leader.

## 2. 2nd Stage.

Indication of aiming points, using aids. **Aids should only be used when absolutely necessary.**


### Various Aids.

**1. Reference points.**—Prominent objects—about 20° apart—Reasonably distant—Of different kinds. Names by which they are known must be made clear to all.

**2. Vertical Clock Ray.**—Shows the direction of an object from a “reference point.” The lowest part of the reference point is taken to be the centre of the face of a clock hanging vertically. The direction of the target right or left of the reference point is given by the Clock Ray.

*Example :* Windmill—4 o'clock—two bushes.


PLATE 11.



**3. Degree method,** the angular distance being measured by graticuled field glasses, by the use of the hand or by any convenient appliance such as the *foresight* or *backsight* of the rifle, or the *foresight* of the Lewis Gun. This method shows approximately the angular distance of the target from the reference point and can also be used to denote, in the case of a distributed fire order, the lateral width of distribution required to cover the target.


*Example:* Windmill—4 o'clock—2°—small bush.

PLATE 12.



i. All officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men should know what angles are subtended by the various parts of their own hands when held at arm's length or by the *sights* of the rifle when held in the aiming position.

PLATE 13.



NOTE.—The degrees shewn are only approximate; each man must test for himself.


ii. For purposes of instruction a degree scale (calculated for a given distance, say 20 yards) should be painted on a wall in barracks.

iii. The angles subtended may vary slightly with each person. It is therefore necessary for each individual to memorize the angles as seen by him.

iv. The indication should end in each case with a description of the aiming point.

Example of the use of both the Clock Ray and Degrees to indicate a target and the amount of distribution required :—  
Windmill—4 o'clock—2°—small bush—right 5°.

PLATE 14.



NOTE.—Combined Clock Ray and degrees make a lengthy fire order and are seldom necessary.


Practice in indication.—A rifle is laid on the point or points to be indicated (or pins can be used on miniature landscape targets); the leader under instruction indicates the target by the methods described above. The remainder of the class recognize it.

**4. Horizontal Clock Code.** This code is used to describe targets to an observer at a distance and when the target cannot be accurately located by co-ordinates on a squared map.

- i. All officers, warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s down to platoon serjeants will be instructed in this method, as it enables infantry to indicate the approximate positions of targets to artillery, machine guns, &c.
- ii. In this method the "reference point" is taken to be the centre of a clock lying flat on the ground with 12 o'clock pointing approximately due north.
- iii. The position of the target is indicated by using a clock ray combined with the distance between the reference point and the target, *estimated in yards*.
- iv. In Plate 15 an infantry observer has seen a gun firing behind some rising ground South of Staple Church, and sends back the following message:—  
 "Reference Map, HAZEBROUCK 5 A. Can see enemy gun firing. Six o'clock. 800 yards from STAPLE CHURCH. Time 1430 hours."
- v. An advantage of this method is that the receiver of the message need not know the sender's position.
- vi. *Reporting observation of artillery fire.*—The Horizontal Clock Code can also be used when reporting the fall of rounds fired by the artillery. In this case the target is taken as the centre of the horizontal clock with 12 o'clock pointing approximately true North.



PLATE 15.



HORIZONTAL CLOCK.

R P = Reference Point.

T = Target.

## NOTES.—

- i. As each round falls, its direction from the target is reported with reference to the clock face and its distance from the target is estimated in yards (*e.g.*, 3 o'clock, 200 yards; 9 o'clock, 50 yards).
- ii. Whenever possible the place or places from which the target can be seen should be stated, or information given as to where a guide can be procured to lead the artillery observing officer to a point whence he can see the target. This gives the artillery observing officer a chance of having the target definitely pointed out to him.

## B.—APPLICATION OF FIRE.

1. "**Fire organization**" is arranged by the higher command to secure co-operation in the fire of various arms and units.

2. "**Fire direction**" refers to instructions given by an officer or non-commissioned officer commanding more than one fire unit to their fire unit leaders as to how the fire of units is to be applied.

3. "**Fire control**" orders are given by fire unit leaders to their men.

4. As laid down in "Infantry Training," Vol. II, Chapter I, 1921, the normal infantry fire unit is the section. In battle, whether in attack or defence, fire will be controlled by the section commander as long as possible.

5. In modern battle, conditions will sometimes exist where control by the section commander is difficult or impossible ; situations will arise where no fire orders or only the briefest instructions may be possible, or it may be obvious to all that fire is required, *e.g.*, to beat down a counter-attack. Under such circumstances it is necessary that every man of the section should understand and should have been trained how to apply fire to the best advantage. A normal system of fire application is required.

6. The following simple system of fire application for the section will be instilled into all ranks :—

The fire of the men of the section may be applied in two ways—i. concentrated, or ii. distributed.

i. Concentrated fire by the men of a section implies that every man of the section applies his fire to the same point.

ii. When distributed fire (*i.e.*, against a linear target such as a line of men or an occupied area) is either called for obviously by the situation, or ordered by the section commander, the men of the section will apply fire in the following manner :—

**The limits between which fire is to be distributed having been named, or being obvious, each rifleman of the section will fire at the approximate point between these limits which corresponds to his actual position in the section. Each Lewis gun will fire in groups of short bursts at irregular intervals within these limits.**

7. This normal system, which is explained (diagrammatically only) in Plate 16, has the following special advantages :—

- i. It ensures that the fire of each section is distributed over the whole of the target.


- ii. It allows any section commander to switch his fire against any other target that the situation may demand, whilst the whole of the original target remains under the fire of the other sections.
- iii. It allows of movement by one section taking place whilst fire is still applied to the whole target by another or other sections.

8. Although this system of fire application is the normal one, the section commander is in no way prohibited from seizing every opportunity that may be offered of directing his fire to the best advantage.

### C.—INSTRUCTION OF LEADERS IN FIRE CONTROL ORDERS.

1. **General Remarks.**—Fire orders should be given :—

- i. (a) As orders.
- (b) With decision.
- (c) Calmly.
- (d) Loudly.
- (e) With pauses (to allow each part to be understood and acted on).
- (f) Every word must be important.
- (g) Avoid conversational tone and manner, and unnecessary or confusing detail.
- ii. **Stop** means reload and wait for orders. The whistle may be used to draw attention.
- iii. **Sighting** best changed by "Up (or Down)—100," &c.
- iv. **Mutual understanding** between commanders and their men simplifies fire orders.



SYSTEM OF DISTRIBUTING FIRE.

A—B = Limits indicated by fire unit commander.

v. **Rapid fire** is normally used to gain the maximum effect in the minimum time ; to obtain surprise effect on a vulnerable target ; to cover the movement of a neighbouring section or sections across an exposed piece of ground. Hence the aim must be to achieve a practically simultaneous opening of fire. In giving an order for "rapid-fire" a pause should be made after the word "rapid" to allow the men to come to the aim ; then on the word "fire" each man will press his trigger when he has got a good aim. Rapid fire is aimed fire, and no attempt should be made to obtain a "volley."

2. Fire control orders may be of three different kinds :—
- i. Normal.
  - ii. Brief.
  - iii. Anticipatory.

An example of each is given below.

3. **Normal fire orders.**—A full and complete fire order, containing :—

- i. Designation of unit, *e.g.*, "No. 5 Section."
- ii. Range, *e.g.*, "five hundred."
- iii. Indication, *e.g.*, "quarter left—gateway—one width right."
- iv. Number of rounds, *e.g.*, "five rounds."
- v. Kind of fire, *e.g.*, "fire," or "rapid fire."

**Reasons for the above method.**

- i. To make it clear to whom the order is addressed.
- ii. The range is given next so that once the men have adjusted their sights they can concentrate their whole atten-

tion on recognising the target. Knowledge of the range also limits the area in which they need search for the target.

iii. The indication of the target is given third and includes the direction and description of the target (as already explained in the section on visual training).

*Indication for concentrated fire.*—The point of aim must be given. This may either be part of the actual target or an auxiliary aiming point. When no special part of the target or auxiliary aiming point is mentioned, the centre of the lowest visible part is intended.

*Indication for distributed fire.*—The limits between which fire is to be distributed will be named. Each section will distribute within the limits indicated as already explained in para. 6 of Section B. above.

iv. The number of rounds (normally 5) is named in order to control the expenditure of ammunition and to ensure a lull in the firing, during which fresh orders can be given if necessary.

v. The kind of fire ordered should be that which the target and the situation at the moment demand.

4. **Brief fire orders** are used when the target is an obvious one, and when time does not admit of a full fire order being given, *e.g.*, "Quarter left—Rapid Fire" or "300—Half Right—Rapid Fire."

5. **Anticipatory fire orders** are used in both attack and defence, anticipating either the movements of our own troops or those of the enemy.

Examples :—

- i. *Attack.*—"No. 5 Section—Four Hundred—Hedge in front of farm house. No. 6 Section is moving up

that covered approach on our right. We must cover their advance while they cross that bit of open ground. Await my order to fire."

- ii. *Defence*.—"No. 3 Section—Five Hundred—Quarter right—Small Wood. When the enemy comes out into the open, open Rapid Fire on my order."

From the above it will be seen that all preparations for opening fire have been made, but the actual opening of fire is withheld until it is required.

#### NOTES FOR INSTRUCTORS.

##### **Methods of practising fire orders.**

1. **Preliminary**.—When practising leaders in fire orders, those under instruction should sometimes be made to write down their orders so that they can afterwards be discussed by the instructor.

2. When exercising leaders and their fire units in fire orders, either landscape targets or open country can be used.

##### **I.—Key rifles may be used as follows:—**

The instructor has two rifles in aiming rests and uses either one or both as required, *e.g.*, one when a concentrated fire order is required and *both* for a distributed fire order, one rifle being laid on each end of the target to show the limits of distribution.

The fire unit leader under instruction who is to give the fire order then looks along the key rifle or rifles and proceeds to give out his fire order.



The other leaders under instruction (also using their rifles in aiming rests or some improvised rests) lay their rifles on what they recognise to be the target, and then stand clear.

The instructor then looks along each rifle in turn and discusses—

- i. The fire order given ; and
- ii. The fire effect that would have been obtained by the class.

**II.—A second method of practising fire orders, using rests, is as follows :—**

Concealed men are called up individually and fire blank ; meanwhile the class, except the commander, is turned away. The men again conceal themselves ; the class is turned about. The commander gives his fire orders, the class adjust sights and lay rifles from rests on the point at which they would have fired. The men are again called up, aims and sights are checked. The fire orders and probable effect of fire are then discussed. As progress is made, two men may be called up at a time and orders given for distribution between the points which they mark. The leaders under instruction will take turns at being the commander. .

**III.—A more advanced exercise in fire orders can be carried out as follows :—**

(In this exercise neither key rifles nor aiming rests will be used.)

The class will occupy a fire position under service conditions, and men equipped with pole targets will represent an enemy platoon in various formations advancing to attack the section in position.

The movements of the men representing the enemy with pole targets can be controlled by whistle and signal by the instructor carrying out the exercise, a previous rehearsal having been carried out to ensure the correct appearances and movements of the target bearers.

### SPECIAL NOTES.

1. The above are not tactical exercises, but are framed in order to practice leaders in fire orders. The suitability or otherwise of the orders should be discussed with reference to the nature of the targets, and the following method of discussion is suggested :—

When it is found that no fire effect would have been obtained, the fire order should be analysed and the poor result traced either to the class or the faultiness of the fire order, *e.g.*, was the range given approximately correct? If so, the class have no excuse for looking for the target at any other distance. Was the indication clear and short, or was there room for doubt? Was the volume and rate of fire ordered suitable to the target? Were aids used when there was no necessity for them?

2. In all the above exercises, absolute accuracy of aim on the part of the class must be insisted on.

### D.—RANGE CARDS.

1. These are of two kinds :—


- i. For use in the attack.
- ii. For use in the defence.

Any available method such as range finding instruments, maps, information from Lewis or Vickers machine gunners, artillery, &c., should be made use of for obtaining the correct range.

**2. Attack range card.**—The successive steps to be taken are as follows :—

- i. Ranges to be taken in *direct* line of advance.
- ii. Draw two parallel lines and fill in *starting point* and *objective*.
- iii. Take or estimate range to the *objective* and write in right-hand column.
- iv. Select some object about half way to the *objective* and enter its range in right-hand column. Select and take ranges to other intermediate objects, choosing those which will be easily recognised when reached and which appear to be near a probable fire position.
- v. A simple subtraction sum will give the range from each successive object to the *objective*. Enter the ranges so obtained in left-hand column and strike out those in the right hand column.

0	Objective (described)	1700
100	Small wood	1600
700	Ruined farm	100
900	Mound, bush on top	800
1300	Line of poplars	400
1700	Starting point (described)	0



RANGE CARD IN DEFENCE.—“A” Taken from right end of York Trench. By  
B. & S. Rangefinder. Made out by Sgt. Brown. 21/3/17.

3. The point from which the ranges are taken should always be described clearly on the card to facilitate setting it.

4. Figure 6 shows an example of a range card made for use in defence. The ranges in this case are supposed to be taken from the point A. The direction line from A to the church is drawn thicker than the other lines to facilitate "setting" the range card in the same manner in which a map is set. When the card is set for the point from which the ranges are taken—which is noted on the card by pointing the thick direction line on the church—the other direction lines will indicate the direction and the ranges of the other points marked on the card.

5. The successive steps to be taken are as follows:—

- i. Mark off on the card the position from which the ranges are taken.
- ii. Describe position accurately.
- iii. Select an unmistakable object and draw a *thick* setting ray to it.
- iv. Draw two semi-circles representing 600 and 1,000 yards respectively.
- v. Select objects to range on, *e.g.*, positions which the enemy may occupy or have to pass; obstacles; a bridge; a gap in a thick hedge; barbed-wire fences.
- vi. Keeping the card set on the setting ray, *draw* rays to show the direction of objects and of lengths corresponding to the distances.
- vii. Write short descriptions in horizontal block lettering or draw representations.

- viii. Write the distance to each object against the description.

NOTES.—i. Avoid too many rays, which are apt to become confusing.

- ii. When possible make one ray do for more than one object.

E.—LEWIS GUN SECTION “FIRE CONTROL ORDERS.”

- i. Unless otherwise stated, a Fire Control Order given to a Lewis Gun Section implies that the gun only will fire.
- ii. If the leader wants to use his rifle fire at the same target as his gun, he will mention “Gun and Rifles.”
- iii. If the gun is temporarily out of action, or the leader wishes to engage a target with rifle fire (whether the gun is in action against another target or not) the fire order will be preceded by the word “Riflemen.”
- iv. The rate of fire to be used with the gun will be controlled as follows:—

If the fire order is:—

*Fire*:—The firer will fire at the rate of 5 bursts a minute.

*Rapid Fire*:—The firer will fire in short bursts with just sufficient pauses between bursts to observe the fire and relay aim.

- v. The duration of the fire can be controlled in two ways, either by—

(a) Stating the number of bursts before the order “Fire” or “Rapid Fire”; or

(b) Not mentioning any definite number of bursts, but merely giving the order “Fire” or “Rapid Fire” followed by the command “Stop.”

## CHAPTER VI.

### FORMATIONS.


1. The battle formations, suitable for a section, can be classified as :—

- i. Narrow frontage in depth.
- ii. Broad frontage.
- iii. Modifications of or combinations of both.

Under i. is "Single file" or "File."

Under ii. is extended line.

Under iii. File opened out to greater intervals laterally and in depth; extended line with flanks echeloned back in depth, forming a kind of arrow head.



*Single file.*      *File.*      *Extended line.*      *Arrow Head.*

2. The training of the section leader in this subject has a twofold aim :—

- i. To know when to adopt any one formation in preference to any other.
- ii. To give the necessary signal, or orders, for the adoption of the formation decided upon.

3. As regards i. he must be taught to recognise the circumstances which indicate preference for any particular formation.

The considerations affecting the type of formation are control, fire production, vulnerability, ground.

Where control is the dominating consideration, file or single file is the best.

For fire production from all weapons, the extended line or arrow head is necessary.

4. The degree of vulnerability offered by any particular formation, depends on the nature and direction of the hostile fire. For crossing a zone swept by *indirect* artillery or machine gun fire there is little to choose between any, and retention of control would probably be the dominating factor. Under *aimed* small arms fire, it is generally accepted from experience, and is also theoretically likely, that the extended line is the least vulnerable (except to enfilade fire), and that file is probably the most vulnerable.

5. If ground would afford concealment to a section moving in arrow head or extended line, it is almost certain that it would afford equally good, if not better, cover to the section if in file or single file.

6. As a general rule control and use of ground are favoured by the narrow frontage formations; fire production and protection from aimed enemy fire by the extended formations.

7. Once the leader has understood the above, practice in various situations is necessary, until he instinctively forms his decision without any delay.



8. As regards ii, the actual word of command, by which he changes from one formation to another, is immaterial, so long as whatever orders he gives are quite simple and readily understood by the men.

9. The above considerations are applicable to both rifle and Lewis gun sections alike, but the formations adopted when the sections stop to open fire frequently present a slightly different picture. With a rifle section the firing formation is normally the movement formation halted, each man adjusting his position to the ground, with the main object of a free use of his rifle.

With a Lewis gun section occupying a fire position the men are disposed to make the best use of the accidents of the ground, for the purpose of serving the gun, according to whether their individual duties are in the nature of firing, feeding, supplying ammunition, protective or observation.

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## CHAPTER VII.

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### GROUND.

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1. The aim of training the section leader in this subject is :—

- i. To teach him to be able to keep direction, and to reconnoitre areas of ground.
- ii. To teach him to weigh up quickly the possibilities of the ground, and make a definite decision as to the way he will use it.
- iii. To make him capable of explaining to his section, before movement, the decision he has reached.

The two main decisions which should be made before movement are :—

- (a) The place to make for.
- (b) The route by which to move to that place.

The detailed selection of either will probably be influenced by factors which could not be discerned from the starting place.

**2. Direction.**—How to lead in the right direction is one of the section leader's most difficult problems. To advance in a direct line across open country in broad daylight to some conspicuous feature presents few difficulties.

The difficulties of direction arise in close or undulating country, at night, or when mist, fog or smoke limit the visibility. Even when it appears beforehand that no difficulty

in keeping direction will arise, the mere fact of making a detour to get concealment will frequently throw leaders off the line of direction.

Whether it is in the van of an advance guard, in an approach march, a deliberate attack, a night patrol, etc., the moment the leader is given his objective he should immediately consider his means of keeping direction. The section commander is unlikely to have either a compass or a map; possibly the objective he is to make for cannot be seen from the starting point: he may have been shown it on the platoon commander's map, and also given the approximate line on the foreground.

Some are more fortunate than others in the possession of an instinctive sense of direction, but even those well favoured in this respect have their calculations upset by a sudden mist or fog.

The means of keeping direction are many. The simplest forms are:—

- i. A series of obvious landmarks, each visible from the previous one.
- ii. The alignment of two distant prominent objects.
- iii. Keeping touch with a guide.
- iv. The sun, moon or stars.
- v. Compass.

**3. Reconnaissance of Ground.**—The development of his mentality in reconnoitring ground should aim at some methodical sequence which will become instinctive. The main features he should look for are:—

- i. Positions favourable for fire effect.
- ii. Places favourable for observation.

- iii. Lines of approach affording concealment or protection.
- iv. Obstacles to movement.
- v. Positions affording protection from hostile fire.

Efficiency in this subject can only be gained by constant practice in studying varying sectors of ground, and forming an instinctive habit of reconnoitring in a methodical sequence. In the early stages this mental process can be developed by exercises, of the nature shown in the extract from "Small Arms Training," repeated in the following chapter.

4. **Entrenching.**—Natural features or accidents of ground will often be found which afford protection from hostile fire in varying degrees ; it will, however, more often be necessary to increase this protection, when time and circumstances permit, by the digging of trenches, erection of breastworks, or converting the existing accidents of the ground, such as ditches, banks, shell-holes, etc. The section leader, therefore, requires training in this subject, especially in laying out tasks and organizing the work of his section.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

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### EXERCISES IN THE USE OF GROUND AND FORMATIONS.

*(Extracts from Small Arms Training.)*

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#### General Note regarding all Exercises:

Instructors should guard against these exercises developing into a game of "hide and seek." Boldness should be encouraged. Crawling should be discouraged by fixing a time limit, and should only be allowed for movement over the last two or three yards into a fire position, and for concealing movement over stretches of a few yards where exposure would otherwise occur.

#### L.—Exercises to teach the use of ground.

##### *Individual stalk.*

*Preliminary.*—A definite point is selected from 200 to 600 yards away, where a sniper or a patrol is supposed to be located, the object being to approach sufficiently close to shoot with the certainty of killing.

*Procedure.*—The class is given a few minutes to study the ground, to decide upon the position from which to shoot, and to consider the best means of getting there. Individuals may then be questioned, and one or more detailed to carry

out the practice within a time limit. The instructor and remainder of the class proceed to the objective to view the action of the selected men, and will note good and bad points.

*Discussion.*—On the conclusion, discussion should take place on the following lines :—

- i. The reasons for the line of approach selected.
- ii. The fire position chosen.
- iii. If risks had to be taken, were they taken early, while there was less chance of being seen and hit, or were they taken late ?
- iv. Was full advantage taken of dead ground and cover, both from fire and view ?
- v. Were skyline, high ground or unsuitable backgrounds avoided ?

## **II.—Exercises to teach the combined use of ground and formations.**

*NOTE.*—Commanders will first exercise their units from a drill point of view only, until simple battle formations, deployments, and changes of direction can be rapidly carried out with precision (see "Infantry Training," Vol. I, Chapter VIII, 1921).

### *Section stalk.*

*Preliminary.*—As in Exercise I, a definite objective is pointed out from 200 to 800 yards away.

*Procedure.*—A few minutes are allowed in which the section leader considers the problem, and decides upon the following points :—

- i. The ultimate fire position.
- ii. The most concealed line of approach.

- iii. The formations to adopt at various stages of the advance.

*Discussion.*—The following points will be brought out :—

- i. Those mentioned for discussion after Exercise I.
- ii. Leadership, handling and command of the section.
- iii. Suitability of the formations adopted.
- iv. The action of individuals.

#### SPECIAL NOTE.

It will be found useful for two sections of a platoon to carry out this exercise together, one attacking, the other defending.

### III.—Exercise to teach the combination of fire and movement.

The attack by two sections under battle conditions (limited frontage) :—

*Preliminary.*—The objective and the limits of the ground which may be used are pointed out.

*Procedure.*—Leaders will have to consider the following points :—

- i. The amount of cover which the ground affords.
- ii. The possibility of advancing without fire, and portions of the ground where the fire of one section may be needed to cover the movement of the other section.

- iii. Suitable fire positions and how to approach them.
- iv. Formations to use and method of advance.
- v. Suitable fire orders to deal with situations that arise.

*Discussion.*

- i. Ground and formations as in Exercise II.
- ii. The combination of fire and movement.
- iii. The fire orders of the leaders, and fire discipline of the men, both of the attackers and the defenders.

SPECIAL NOTE.

- 1. The remaining two sections of the platoon should act as defenders of the position, as in Exercise II.
- 2. Coloured flags will be found useful in this stage to denote various volumes of fire under which the attackers come during their advance.
- 3. There should be one umpire with each attacking section, and also one with the defenders.

The officers use the flags to denote :—

- (a) The effect of the fire of the defenders ; and
- (b) The successful action of the attackers to overcome the hostile resistance.

- 4. In order that men shall not be confused by the colour of the flags used in these exercises they must have the same significance as those used throughout the Army.



The following colours and significance will therefore be adhered to :—

Flag or screen.	For attacking sections.	For defending sections.
Yellow ...	Under sniping fire. Advance possible without covering fire	Under long range fire. Fire power of defence unaffected.
Blue ...	Under fire of considerable volume. Further advance only possible by fire and movement	Under fire of considerable volume. Fire power of defence decreased by 50 per cent.
Red ...	Under fire of such intensity that further movement is impossible	Under fire of such intensity that fire of defence is silenced.

## CHAPTER IX.

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### COMMUNICATION.

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1. Means of communication are a vital factor in the success of any operation, and serve two purposes. They are the channel from higher authority to subordinates for the issue of orders by which the actions of all separate bodies are co-ordinated. From subordinates to higher authority they serve as a vital aid in centralizing the information gained in several places, and afford the higher commander material on which to consider his further action.

2. The training of the section leader in this subject comprises knowledge of :—

- i. The means of keeping in touch with his platoon commander.
- ii. The type of information likely to be of value to his platoon commander.
- iii. The power of expressing the information clearly and concisely in a message.
- iv. Signals.

3. Extracts from "Infantry Training," Vol. II, 1921 :—

**"All commanders are responsible for keeping their respective superiors, as well as neighbouring and subordinate commanders, regularly informed of the progress of events and of important changes in the situation as they occur.**

All ranks should notice what takes place within their view and hearing, and report anything of importance accurately and at once to their superior, who will pass it on to the higher commanders and to neighbouring units.

This is the foundation of co-operation in war, and is essential not only in battle, but at every stage of a campaign.

\* \* \* \*

The importance of giving orders in a firm tone of voice, and in a calm, determined manner cannot be exaggerated.

\* \* \* \*

The passing of verbal orders and messages should be reduced to a minimum, owing to the liability of errors in transmission. In the leading platoons all verbal messages must be passed as quietly as possible. The fewer the individuals by whom the message has to be repeated, the less chance will there be of errors creeping in."

4. "Infantry Training," Vol. I, Chapter V, repeated for convenient reference :—

#### FIELD SIGNALS.

##### *General Remarks.*

"(1) Control of troops in the field, particularly when extended or deployed, can be exercised far better, because far quicker, by signals than by verbal or written messages. When troops are actually to be committed to a definite form of action against the enemy, full instructions should be given by the commander whenever possible. But during the approach march, and at all times when quickness of movement is the first and main essential, control by signals should be used, provided the conditions are suitable.

(2) When controlling troops by signal a "short blast" of the whistle (*i.e.*, "the cautionary blast," see para. below) will first be blown, before making the signal, in order to attract the attention of the troops. When he is satisfied that the signal is understood, the commander will drop his hand to his side, on which the units under him will act as ordered. Signals should be made with whichever arm will show most clearly what is meant. Small flags will often be found useful.

### Signals.

The following "control signals" are used :—

(1) *Extend*.—The arm extended to full extent over the head and waved slowly from side to side, the hand to be open and to come down as low as the hips on both sides of the body.

(2) *Deploy*.—Both arms waved horizontally across the body in line with the shoulder.

(3) *Deploy from the centre*.—Both arms raised above the head and then allowed to fall until they are stretched out in line with the shoulder on either side of the body.

NOTE.—If it is required to extend or deploy to a flank, the commander will point to the required flank after finishing the signal.

(4) *Advance*.—The arm swung from rear to front below the shoulder.

(5) *Halt*.—The arm raised at full extent above the head.

(6) *Retire*.—The arm circled above the head.

(7) *Change direction, right (or left)*.—The arm is first extended in line with the shoulder. A circular movement is

then made, on completion of which the arm and body should point in the required direction.

NOTES.—i. When troops are halted, the above signal means *change position, right (or left)*.

ii. When troops are in column of fours, or in file or single file, the above signal means *right (or left) wheel*.

(8) *Right (or Left) incline*.—The body or horse turned in the required direction and arm extended in line with the shoulder, and pointing in the required direction.

NOTE.—There is no separate signal for the command *right (or left) turn*, but the “incline signal” given twice in succession will effect the required movement.

(9) *Close*.—The hand placed on top of the head, elbow to be square to the right or left, according to which hand is used.

NOTES.—i. The above signal denotes *close* (on the centre). If it is required to close on a flank, the leader will point to the required flank before dropping his hand.

ii. If when on the march it is required to halt as well as close, the leader will perform the halt signal before dropping his hand.

(10) *Quick time*.—The hand raised in line with the shoulder, the elbow bent and close to the side.

(11) *Double*.—The clenched hand moved up and down between the thigh and shoulder.

(12) *Follow me*.—The arm swung from rear to front above the shoulder.

(13) *Lie down*.—Two or three slight movements of the open hand towards the ground.

(14) *As you were*.—Arm extended downwards, waved across the body, parallel to the ground.

### **Signals with the rifle.**

The following “communicating signals” are made with the rifle or flags:—

(1) *Enemy in sight in small numbers*.—Weapon held up above, as if guarding the head.

(2) *Enemy in sight in large numbers*.—As for “Enemy in sight in small numbers,” but the weapon raised and lowered frequently.

(3) *No enemy in sight*.—Weapon held up at full extent of arm, point or muzzle uppermost.

These signals are valuable in the case of scouts, etc., sent on ahead from their sections. Care should be taken that signals cannot be seen by the enemy.

### **Control by whistle blasts and bugle calls.**

The following whistle blasts are used:—

(1) *The cautionary blast (a short blast)*.—To draw attention to a signal about to be made.

(2) *The rally blast (a succession of short blasts)*.—To denote close on the leader in wood, bush, fog or darkness, when the signal cannot be seen.

NOTE.—On the above blast being given, the men will double towards the sound of the whistle, and will rally on the leader, facing in the same direction.

(3) *The alarm blast (a succession of alternate long and short blasts).*—To turn out troops from camp or bivouac to fall in or to occupy previously arranged positions.

(4) The only bugle call used in war is the "Alarm."

NOTE.—With a view to peace operations all ranks should be made acquainted with the "stand fast," the "continue," and the "dismiss."

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## CHAPTER X.

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### GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INSTRUCTION IN APPLYING KNOWLEDGE OF THE USE OF WEAPONS, GROUND AND FORMATIONS.

1. If side by side with training in the foregoing subjects, the leader has also been instructed in his administrative duties, and to drill men in close order drill, he should have made considerable progress in his education as a leader by development of two of the important elements of leadership, viz., knowledge and confidence.

2. So far the three principal subjects have been dealt with separately, and the lines on which they should be studied indicated.

The art of leadership is to put them into practice, in combination, under the different circumstances and conditions which will be encountered in the varying phases of battle.

"Minor tactical exercises without troops," confined to the problems of the section leaders, are the next stage of progressive instructions. Every section leader should take part in a large variety of such exercises.

3. Circumstances and conditions will never be the same in any two battles. Further, no peace exercises can ever give the true representation of the realities of war, but exercises can be formulated which produce sufficient degrees of similarity to battle conditions to give the section leaders practice in applying the art of leadership.

Chapters XI and XII give an indication of the type of instruction which can be brought out in minor tactical exercises for section leaders.



**4. Organization.**—The section leader should understand the organization of a battalion.

A Battalion ...	H.Q.
	H.Q. Wing (including the M.G. platoon, and anti-aircraft Lewis gunners).
	4 Companies.
A Company ...	H.Q.
	4 Platoons.
A Platoon ...	H.Q.
	4 Sections.

Of the 4 sections of a platoon, 2 are rifle sections and 2 Lewis gun sections. In other words, a platoon consists of 4 sections, all possessing fire power and bayonet power, but two are relatively stronger in fire power than the other two, which are stronger in bayonet power.

5. The aim of infantry in battle is to close with the enemy, and destroy him by killing or capture. Surprise is one of the best means towards this end.

Movement to close with the enemy is made possible both by the use of ground and by beating down hostile resistance by fire. Whilst the main aim of both rifle and Lewis gun sections is alike, in that they both have the set purpose of closing with the enemy, the main distinction between them is that the rifle section seeks the opportunity to use the bayonet, while the Lewis gun section seeks the opportunity to use fire.

6. Before the section leader under instruction is given a section to lead in a manoeuvre combined with other units, he should be given opportunities by lectures and demonstrations of getting a mental picture of a company or even a battalion deployed for attack and distributed for defence.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE ATTACK.

1. From the point of view of section leaders, two very distinct forms of attack may be visualised :—

- i. An attack in which practically all the fire to cover movement is provided by weapons not contained within the platoon, in the form of a barrage.
- ii. An attack in which the platoon relies entirely, or to a great extent, on the fire of its own weapons to assist its forward movement.

2. In the case of i. the plan is very carefully and methodically prepared, and instructions issued in great detail. In such form of attack the section leader is mainly occupied in :—

- i. Keeping his section under good control.
- ii. Leading in the right direction.
- iii. Taking full advantage of the cover afforded by the fire to keep up the forward movement, *e.g.*, if the fire is in the form of a barrage, keeping as close up to it as possible, even to taking considerable risk of casualties from it.
- iv. Dealing with all enemy resistance encountered.
- v. Making full use of his own weapons to get forward again, should he momentarily lose the protection of the barrage, and have opposition to overcome before he can catch it up again.

3. In an attack of this nature, rifle and Lewis gun sections are similarly employed, until the objective is reached, or the barrage lost, the bayonet being for the moment the primary weapon of either section.

When, however, the objective is reached, or in position warfare the barrage is lost, it is no reason for the pressure on the enemy to be relaxed. Sections must continue fighting their way forward by the use of the fire of their own weapons until such time as definite orders are given to consolidate the position gained. The principles employed are of the same nature as in an attack of the type specified in para. 1. ii.

4. As regards para. 1. ii, the section leader may be taught that in an attack of any appreciable magnitude he may expect some assistance from artillery, machine guns, perhaps tanks, the degree of assistance varying with circumstances. But there are occasions when platoons will be called upon to rely entirely upon their own weapons for their progress.

Examples of such occasions are: When the leading platoons of an advanced guard encounter the enemy's protective troops; when sending forward patrols after reaching the objective in a deliberately planned attack; protection of convoys; minor engagements in certain types of campaign.

It is in such actions that the highest degree of skill of leadership by the section leader is exercised. Once he is fully qualified to lead his section in attacks of this nature, he should experience little difficulty in adapting his skill to an attack of the type specified in para. 1. i. above.

5. The following is an outline of the action required of section leaders, in the phases of an attack in which the platoon is relying on the use of its own weapons for its progress.

6. The plan of attack having been made, the platoon commander indicates to section leaders the direction of their advance, and the objective, and any other information or necessary instructions concerning his plan.

7. In reading this assume :—

- i. The platoon frontage is about 250 yards.
- ii. Other platoons are on either flank.
- iii. The enemy resistance will probably be in the nature of covering troops who have only made hasty dispositions.

8. 1st PHASE.—**Preliminary.** Action of all section commanders :—

- i. Explain direction to men of section and indicate it by any available landmarks.
- ii. Explain the position of other sections and Platoon H.Q.
- iii. Explain to men any information or instructions mentioned by platoon commander in connection with the plan.
- iv. Move sections to deployed positions.
- v. Indicate reference point or points.
- vi. If time, get out notebooks and make an attack range card.
- vii. Section commanders of *leading* sections send two men to move ahead of the section as scouts. (The distance ahead these two men should move depends on the ground. As a guide, it may be said that they should be as far forward as is necessary to

prevent the section being surprised, or coming under close range fire in an unfavourable position, but at the same time they should keep within view of the section.)

#### 9. 2nd PHASE.—The approach.

The platoon having deployed, the advance starts in accordance with whatever orders have been issued, or by pre-arranged signal. The scouts of the forward sections maintain a steady rate of forward movement to successive positions of observation, making use of any covered approaches. The section leaders lead their sections in the wake of the scouts. The supporting sections do not send out scouts, as the line of advance is being made good for them by the forward sections.

In this phase the section leaders are occupied mainly in keeping direction, and changing their formations to suit the ground, or to avoid loss if they are under enemy artillery or long range small arms fire.

#### 10. 3rd PHASE.—The fire fight.

As the leading scouts approach the enemy's position, they should locate the enemy's forward posts, either by observation or through drawing fire.

When the scouts are checked, the section leader leads his section close up to the scouts, and halts under cover. He then hears from the scout the information concerning the enemy, and studies the ground.

He then has to decide which of two alternatives he will take—either (i) continue to advance, or (ii) stop and open fire. In coming to a decision he must be guided by circumstances, remembering that the fact of continuing to advance would

generally be the best means of helping a neighbour, and that, as a principle, fire should rarely be opened in attack when satisfactory progress can be made without it.

When the limit of progress without fire has been reached, the section leader orders the section to occupy a fire position, makes up his mind as to the target he wants to fire at, and gives the necessary fire order.

Either as the result of his own fire, or that of a neighbouring section, one or other of the leading sections seeks the opportunity to bound forward to another fire position. The indications he will get as to the most favourable opportunity for getting forward are:—

- i. The fact that he is not being fired at ; or
- ii. The fact that other sections are attracting the enemy, either by fire or movement.

Whilst the leading sections are thus engaging the enemy, the platoon commander will have taken in the situation, and will have issued orders for the manoeuvre of the supporting sections, with a view to outflanking, or getting to a position from which they can assault the enemy post.

It may happen that this manoeuvre by the supporting sections attracts the enemy's fire. If so, these sections will continue their progress by rushes from fire positions to fire positions. If the fire is so severe that their progress is definitely checked, the original leading sections may find it their opportunity to get forward. This action may re-attract the enemy's fire, and thus relieve the pressure off the original supporting sections, and enable them to get on again.

Thus the fight continues until some section or sections are in a position to assault the enemy positions.

#### 11. 4th PHASE.—**The assault.**

The assault will probably be initiated by the platoon commander, or will take place on the initiative of any section leader who has manœuvred his section to a position from which he can rush the enemy post.

The covering fire of other sections should be intensified when they see any section in a position to assault.

The nature of the ground, and the position of any obstacles will influence the manner in which the section covers the intervening ground to assault the enemy position.

Pace and determination in the rush towards the enemy post will lead to success. Where ground and obstacles make movement slow, the attackers should cover their own advance by pausing momentarily to take an aimed snap shot. Smoke grenades may be fired either to blind the post about to be rushed, or to screen the assaulting sections from the view of other enemy posts, which may be supporting the post about to be assaulted.

The personal influence of a good leader will ensure control and consequently success at this stage.

#### 12. 5th PHASE.—**Re-organisation.**

Immediately the enemy position has been assaulted, the leaders will get their sections under control, and prepare to resume the advance, or to deal with a counter-attack. The sections which have been covering the assault with fire will move forward as soon as they see that the assault has succeeded.

# EXAMPLE OF A MINOR TACTICAL EXERCISE FOR SECTION LEADERS.


13. The following concrete example of a minor tactical exercise for section leaders, is set out to show the nature of the problems which section leaders should be called upon to solve. It is based on the foregoing paragraphs.


14. On no account must it be regarded as a set form of attack to be followed on all occasions.

15. The narrative starts by assuming that the enemy have been located but the exact details of their dispositions are not known. The battalion, to which this platoon belongs, has deployed, and is advancing towards the area occupied by the enemy.


This particular platoon is one of the leading platoons, and has orders to advance on a frontage of about 200 yards, towards a definite objective.


16. The platoon commander has decided on this occasion to advance in a "square" formation with the two Lewis gun sections leading.

 N° 2.

 N° 4.

5 H.Q.

N° 1. 

 N° 3.



Before deploying, he indicates to section leaders, the direction of their advance, the objective, and any other information or necessary instructions concerning his plan.

#### 17. 1ST PHASE.—**Preliminary.**

The section leaders under instruction are required to answer, in exact detail, the action they would take, to conform to the instructions contained in each subheading mentioned in paragraph 8 of this chapter.

#### 18. 2ND PHASE.—**The approach.**

*Narrative.*—The advance starts in accordance with whatever orders have been issued, or by pre-arranged signal.

Shortly after the forward movement had started, and the scouts of No. 4 section have reached a good point of observation, they locate an enemy machine gun (subsequently referred to as M.G. "Y"), firing from a position about 500 yards away slightly to their left front.

One of the scouts remains to point it out to the section leader when he comes up, whilst the other makes his way forward to another position of observation about 100 yards further on.

When the section leader is receiving the scout's report, the enemy machine gun (M.G. "Y") again opens fire. When it does so, he notices No. 2 section, on his left, rush forward, and get down behind a fold in the ground.

**19. Problem for solution by No. 4 Section Commander.**—Will he stop where he is, and open fire against the machine gun (M.G. "Y") or will he continue his advance?

*Situation.*—No. 2 section's action gave the impression that it was being fired at, but, as it had got under cover, was all right so far. The scout of No. 4 section had got forward about 100 yards, so the section should be able to do so.

*Decision.*—Continue to advance.

*Execution.*—No. 4 Section—We will make for that small bank about 100 yards ahead where Pte. X is—Follow me in arrow head.

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—i. Fire should rarely be opened by infantry in attack when satisfactory progress can be made without it.

(Exception: Specially favourable target, or to relieve pressure off a neighbour caught in a bad position, and likely to suffer heavy loss.)

ii. To continue to advance is generally the best means of helping a neighbour.

**20. Problem for solution by No. 2 Section Commander.**  
What should he do when the enemy machine gun (M.G. "Y") opened fire on his section?

*Situation.*—The section was on an exposed stretch of ground when fire was opened on it. The scouts had already got forward.

*Decision.*—Extend and rush to cover.

*Execution.*—On my right and left four paces, Double to that ditch.

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—A section commander will extend his section as soon as it

comes under effective rifle or machine gun fire. If a section finds a long downward slope devoid of cover, it is often best to make one rush to the bottom of the slope.

## 21. Problem for solution by No. 1 Section Commander.

—Having seen the section in front of him fired on, whilst crossing a certain part of the ground, how should he avoid risk of loss when he approaches that place.

*Situation.*—To find a way round under cover would entail a very long detour. The enemy post is over 500 yards away. It is a machine gun, so probably would not fire at a widely extended section. Other forward sections will probably be attracting its attention.

*Decision.*—Extend his section as he approaches the exposed ground, get across it, and close his section to file again when under cover.

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—The section commander must use his intelligence and change from one formation to another as the ground dictates.

Loss in crossing ground within range of the enemy's fire can be reduced in two ways:—

- i, By concealment of movement.
- ii. By rapidity of movement.

## 22. 3RD PHASE.—The fire fight.

*Narrative.*—No. 4 section gets forward up to its leading scouts, keeping out of sight of the enemy post. It is now within 400 yards of the enemy machine gun (M.G. "Y").

The ground forward of its present position is bare and exposed to the enemy. The leading sections of the platoon on the right are about the same level, but have stopped, and are firing at some enemy posts in front of them.

No. 2 section is working its way forward, almost unseen, and is about 350 yards away from the enemy post (M.G. "Y"), but the ground offering a further line of advance contains several exposed spaces alternately with spaces affording cover. The platoon on the left is getting forward slowly.

### 23. Problem for No. 4 Section Commander.

- i. Should he stop and open fire ?
- ii. If so, should he fire at M.G. "Y," or at the enemy posts which are firing at the platoon on his right.
- iii. Should he use L.G. fire only, or L.G. and rifle fire.

*Situation.*—Bareness of ground in front. Is he likely to get sufficiently far forward to make sufficient difference to the chances of fire effect to justify the risk of casualties ?

As the opposition is a M.G. it won't offer any bigger target from a more oblique direction.

Any place he could get to which would enable him to enfilade the posts engaging the platoon on his right would bring him under the fire of the post (M.G. "Y").

Bearing on iii. an enemy M.G. although only a small target to hit, represents fire power worthy of the expenditure of ammunition of automatic fire.

The target is not sufficiently urgent to justify expenditure of his limited supply of rifle ammunition by rifle fire as well at this early stage of the encounter.

*Decision.*—Stop and open fire at M.G. post using L.G. only.

*Execution.*—Select point where gun is to be mounted  
Signal "ACTION." Fire a ranging burst. "No. 4 Section—400—slightly left—gate in low hedge—one width right—one burst—FIRE." Correct elevation or aiming point according to where he sees the shots strike, and continue firing at slow rate.

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—The Lewis gun sections should be prepared to work in close co-operation with each other. By the skilful use of fire and movement they will often be able to silence a definitely located M.G. which is checking the advance.

A section commander must assist neighbouring sections with his fire whenever he sees an opportunity.

24. *Narrative.*—No. 4 Section has opened fire on M.G. "Y," and already made it switch its fire off No. 2 section. No. 2 section commander, noticing this, makes an attempt to advance further, and as his scouts start to cross the open space, they are shot at by another M.G. from the direction of their right front (i.e., almost directly in front of No. 4 section). This post will be called M.G. "X."

This enemy post (M.G. "X"), is so situated, that it fires across the front of post M.G. "Y," and sweeps the exposed ground which No. 2 section is trying to cross. The scouts of No. 2 section get behind a bit of cover and signal to the section commander to come and reconnoitre.

**25. Problem for No. 2 Section Commander.**—Shall he stop and open fire at M.G. "X," or try and rush forward.

*Situation.*—No. 4 section cannot touch M.G. "X."  
No. 4 section is engaged in a duel with M.G. "Y."  
If M.G. "Y" could switch off No. 4 section, it could take on No. 2 section. If No. 2 section advanced, he would be under the fire of M.G. "Y" for a long period.

*Decision.*—Open fire at M.G. "X."

*Execution.*—Select fire position for gun covered from M.G. "Y" and signal ACTION—using the gun only. "No. 2 section—400—half right—Railway signal post—8 o'clock—freshly dug earth—one burst—FIRE."

(When elevation corrected from observation, continue fire at slow rate.)

*Special lesson introduced by this lesson.*—Don't stop advancing to open fire, so long as it is possible to continue advancing without it, unless, by withholding fire, undue loss may be suffered.

## **26. 4TH PHASE. The Assault.**

*Narrative.*—Nos. 2 and 4 sections have both reached positions from which they are firing at the enemy.

The platoon commander has his two rifle sections available for manoeuvre.

The ground on the left of No. 2 section offers the best chance of approach.

The platoon commander moves Nos. 1 and 3 sections under cover to the neighbourhood of No. 2 section and sends a runner to No. 2 section commander, telling him to keep an

intensive fire on M.G. "X," whilst Nos. 1 and 3 cross the exposed ground. M.G. "Y" is still attracted by No. 4 section.

Other enemy posts on the flanks are engaged by the platoons opposing them—Nos. 1 and 3 sections get within about 150 yards on the flank of M.G. "Y" without attracting its fire.

Both sections are now faced by an open stretch of ground.

Suddenly an enemy supporting M.G. "Z," from about 400 yards to their left front, opens fire on them. The platoon commander is a casualty.

## **27. Problem for solution by Nos. 1 and 3 Section Leaders.**

What should they do ?

The solution of the individual section leaders will depend on the exact position they occupy, with reference to the position of M.G. "Y" and M.G. "Z."

The discussion of this problem should bring out the importance of boldness and determination. Any hesitation, which would allow the enemy to recover from the gruelling he had had in the fire fight, would be to the disadvantage of the attackers.

The possible use of smoke, to cover the assault, should also be discussed, the prevailing conditions of wind being considered also whether it should be used to blind M.G. "Y," or to screen the line of advance from M.G. "Z."

## **28. 5TH PHASE. Reorganisation.**

*Narrative.*—The post M.G. "Y" has been captured by Nos. 1 and 3 sections. No. 4 section has ceased fire.

**29. Problem for Solution by Leaders of all Sections.—**  
**What will be their next action ?**

*Situation.*—The platoon commander is a casualty. The platoon sergeant is near No. 2 section. No. 4 section is now free. No. 2 section is still engaged with M.G. "X" which is on No. 4 section's direct line of advance. Nos. 1 and 3 sections are in a position to enfilade M.G. "X" but are exposed to the fire of M.G. "Z."

*Decision.*—Don't wait for instructions to reach them from the platoon sergeant, but carry on the fight.

*Execution.*—Nos. 1 and 3 section leaders quickly get their sections under control.

No. 1 section open fire on M.G. "Z" (give fire order).

No. 3 section open fire on M.G. "X" (select fire position and give fire order).

No. 2 section continue to engage M.G. "X."

No. 4 section advance and capture post M.G. "X."

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—Troops having carried out a successful assault must reorganise as quickly as possible, and be prepared either to beat off a counter-attack, or continue the advance.

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## CHAPTER XII.

### DEFENCE.

1. The phases of defensive action may be divided into :—
  - i. Organisation of a defensive position.
  - ii. Approach of the enemy.
  - iii. The fire fight.
  - iv. The enemy assault.
  - v. The counter-attack.
2. As far as the section leader is concerned the position he is to occupy will be pointed out to him. He will probably receive definite instructions as to the type of work on the defences he is to undertake.
3. As, however, a body of troops may be suddenly required to assume a defensive rôle, every section leader must be prepared to occupy a position, and convert it into a section post for defence on his own initiative.
4. It is therefore most important that every section leader should understand the principles which govern defensive action, and the instructions laid down in Infantry Training should be explained to them in such form as will give them a correct mental impression.
5. Minor tactical exercises without troops should then be carried out, confined to details of defence schemes in so far as they affect the section leaders.

6. The following is intended merely to indicate the type of decision the section leader may be expected to have to make on the battlefield, and which should therefore form the problems he should be asked to solve during training by means of minor tactical exercises without troops.

#### 7. PHASE 1. **The preliminary stages.**

Assuming that a platoon is part of a forward company and that the troops have been able to take up their allotted positions without interference on the part of the enemy. The platoon commander, having reconnoitred the ground, issues instructions as to the positions to be occupied by each section and explains his plan for covering the approaches with fire.

The section leaders will lead their sections to their allotted positions.

#### 8. Section leaders will then :—

- i. Explain to the men the general situation and the position of other sections and platoon H.Q.
- ii. Detail the men of his section to tasks, posting one as sentry.
- iii. Decide how he will construct fire positions for each man, either by making use of existing accidents of the ground or, if such are unsuitable, digging slits or holes to afford cover, with the primary consideration that each man can use his weapon.
- iv. Select and indicate the ground he would make a special point of being able to sweep with fire.
- v. Select and indicate reference points and make a range card.

- vi. Give instructions as to the method to be employed for concealing excavated earth.
- vii. If a Lewis gun section, have the magazines placed so as to be ready for the gun when wanted.

9. Special arrangements for night :—

- i. Post double instead of single sentries, and work out the time table of reliefs accordingly.
- ii. Make out a cut-and-dried-plan, so that every man knows exactly what to do in case of alarm. Re-hearse this before dusk.
- iii. Look for and indicate to men any means, such as objects which would be silhouetted against the sky, which would serve as a guide at night to knowing the direction of neighbouring posts and platoon H.Q.
- iv. Fix bayonets.
- v. Study the ground in front of the platoon area, and make a mental note of places to make for and aids to keeping direction if ordered to go out as a patrol during the night.

10. In order to prevent the company being surprised, the company commander will, before the organization of the position is commenced, push forward either a whole platoon or one section from each forward platoon to occupy a covering position.

The action of these covering troops is governed by Chapter II, Infantry Training, Vol. II, 1921 (Outposts) and will not be dealt with here.

**PHASE 2.—Approach of enemy.**

11. First indication of the approach of the enemy may come from covering troops, aeroplane observation, or mounted or neighbouring troops, but good observation by the sentries of the infantry posts will probably be the first definite information. Timely warning can only be obtained by the sentries keeping a lookout for the advanced scouts of the enemy, who will probably be taking full advantage of the ground.

12. When the section leaders get indication of the approach of the enemy they will order their sections to adopt a position of readiness for opening fire, at the same time avoiding making any movement which would prematurely disclose to the enemy the position of their post.

**PHASE 3.—The fire fight.**

13. Assume that the covering sections or platoons have withdrawn, and that the enemy are now making a determined advance.

14. The main duty of the section leaders at this stage will be to control the fire of their sections. The enemy will probably present targets in the nature of small groups of men working their way forward, by use of the ground, fire and movement.

Some of the artillery of both sides will probably be shelling the opposing infantry. Smoke will probably obscure the view in various places at various times.

15. The section leaders will be required to pick out the targets most suitable for their fire. Their first consideration must be to deal with any enemy who may come into the area which they have been specially ordered to sweep with fire.

They must avoid being attracted by other targets, which should be engaged by other sections, thus neglecting the area which is their special responsibility. It is by this means that the plan as a whole will work to the best advantage.

No matter how threatening the situation may appear, there must be no relaxation of calm and clear fire orders. Steady and accurate fire is of far greater value than any form of wild indiscriminate fire.

#### PHASE 4.—The enemy assault.

16. If the enemy is launching a really determined attack, well supported by fire, the give and take of the fight may enable him to penetrate the fire screen of the defence at some places, and get to close grips with the garrisons of the defence posts.

17. The section leaders of the posts being assaulted must act with great determination, and continue to fight the enemy with controlled fire, and finally use the bayonet if opportunity offers.

18. The section leaders of posts not threatened with direct assault must continue to hold their posts, no matter what has happened to neighbouring posts. They must continue to engage the enemy with fire, both for the purpose of helping a neighbouring post to defeat a threatened assault, also to assist in creating a favourable opportunity for the launching of a counter-attack.

### PHASE 5.—The counter-attack.

19. Counter-attacks will usually be carried out by the garrisons of supporting posts, which have been specially earmarked for the purpose. But any section leader should be prepared to make a local counter-attack.

The counter-attack may be conducted on a previously rehearsed plan, or it may be launched on only very brief instructions from the commander.

20. The section leaders taking part in the counter-attack will be required to lead their sections with great dash, and fight the enemy before he has time to recover from the disorganisation which he will have been thrown into during the attack.


21. The section leaders of the posts holding out must keep a good lookout to see how they can best assist the counter-attack by their fire.

### EXAMPLE OF MINOR TACTICAL EXERCISE IN THE DEFENCE FOR SECTION LEADERS.

22. *Narrative.*—It is assumed that there is time to organise a system of resistance and that the troops have been able to take up their allotted positions without interference on the part of the enemy. The platoon commander has issued instructions for the sections of his platoon to occupy the defensive posts as shown in the following diagram.

*Diagram.*

NOTE.—Country, mostly grass and fairly open but intersected with hedges which to a certain extent obscure the view from our position.



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
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*Diagram.*

NOTE.—Country, mostly grass and fairly open but intersected with hedges which to a certain extent obscure the view from our position.



**PHASE 1.—The preparation and organization of a defensive position.**

23. The platoon has arrived on the ground. All sections start working on their section posts.

Nothing has been heard of any enemy being in the vicinity of this platoon area.

**24. Problem for solution by Nos. 2 and 4 section leaders.**

What preliminary steps would they take to prepare the section posts for defence ?

*Solution.*—Their answer should include :—

- i. The detailing of individual men as reliefs for look-out and work on the defences.
- ii. The type of cover they would make on the assumption that the normal allotment of tools is available.
- iii. The ground they would make a special point of being able to sweep with fire, such as No. 4 section would sweep with fire across the front of No. 2 section and the southern edges of ROEDEER WOOD, No. 2 section would sweep across the front of No. 4 section.
- iv. The arrangements to make the post capable of all-round defence.
- v. The selection of reference points and the preparation of a range card.
- vi. The arrangement for the Lewis gun ammunition.

- vii. The steps they would take to conceal the excavated earth.
- viii. The information and instructions they would give the sentries.

**25. Problem for solution by No. 3 section leader.**

Assuming that he has made all the arrangements referred to in the solution above, what additional arrangements would he make for the organisation of his post at night.

*Solution.*—Post double instead of single sentries, and work out the time table of reliefs accordingly.

State his cut-and-dried plan of immediate action in case of alarm.

Indicate the landmarks he would select which would serve as an aid at night to knowing the direction of the neighbouring posts, and platoon H.Q.

Fix bayonets.

Explain his arrangements by which each man could fire in certain directions at night, if necessary, without risk of firing into a neighbouring section.

Study the ground in front of the platoon area and indicate the places he would make for, and the means he would take to keep direction, if ordered to go out as a patrol during the night.

**PHASE 2.—Approach of the enemy.**

26. *Narrative.*—About two hours after the covering troops had been withdrawn the sentry of No. 4 section calls the attention of the section leader to a hostile cavalry patrol of

about one section, moving south from X. The scouts of this patrol have at this moment reached a point about where the X of "From X" is marked on the diagram.

### 27. Problems for solution by No. 4 section leader.

What action would he take ?

*Situation.*—The section by now should be sufficiently dug in to be able to avoid being seen. The job of the hostile patrol is presumably to reconnoitre.

*Decision.*—Adopt a position of readiness to open fire when decisive result can be obtained. Signal "Enemy in sight" to platoon H.Q. and other posts.

*Lessons specially introduced by this problem.*—Premature opening of fire discounts surprise. Importance of being able to communicate with Platoon H.Q. and other posts without giving away position.

28. In this phase further problems for solution can be set by explaining imaginary actions on the part of the cavalry patrol and calling on section leaders to explain what action they would take.

### PHASE 3.—The fire fight.

29. *Narrative.*—The enemy cavalry turned out to be the van of an advanced guard. The enemy infantry have deployed and are attacking the position.

30. For this phase, the problems for solution are set by pointing out the imaginary positions of various groups of attacking enemy, the section leaders being required to give "fire orders."

#### PHASE 4.—Enemy assault.

31. *Narrative.*—On the east side of the road the enemy occupied the SLAG HEAP, and opened machine gun fire from there, but no infantry could be seen advancing on that side of the road.

On the west side of the road, in spite of many casualties, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the chain of posts, and got possession of the spur occupied by Nos. 3 and 4 sections, under cover of smoke.

As the smoke cleared, No. 2 section leader realised this; and also saw a small group of the enemy crossing the road immediately east of the post which had been occupied by No. 3 section—evidently their intention is to attack No. 1 section post.

#### 32. Problem for solution by No. 2 section leader.

What action would he take?

*Situation.*—Enemy firing from SLAG HEAP but not advancing. Enemy's penetration on left requires attention.

*Decision.*—Leave two men observing to the front, and turn the Lewis gun, and the remainder of the men, facing left rear. Give a fire order to fire at the enemy crossing the road.

*Special lesson introduced by this problem.*—Infantry allotted to the defence of a defence post are responsible for holding it at all costs, and for inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy.

The fact that any post or locality in their neighbourhood is lost, must, on no account, be considered a reason for them to withdraw, in order to conform with a consequent readjustment of the line.

*Narrative* (continued).—The fire of No. 2. section, catching the enemy in enfilade, left but four of them able to move. These got under cover of a steep bank and opened fire on No. 2 section.

**33. Problem for solution by No. 1 Section leader.**

What action will he take ?

His choice of action depends on exactly how the situation appears on the ground where the problem is set. He might be in a position to charge them or to fire rifle grenades to drive them from their cover, to enable No. 2 section to fire at them in the open.

**PHASE 5.—The counter-attack.**

34. *Narrative*.—A counter-attack by a supporting platoon is now launched to regain the lost position.

**35. Problem for solution by Nos. 1 and 2 section leaders.**

The fire orders they would give to assist the counter-attack.

36. *Narrative* (concluded).—The counter-attacking platoon, assisted by the fire of Nos. 1 and 2 sections, succeeded in defeating the enemy's attack.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

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### NOTES ON CONDUCTING MINOR TACTICAL EXERCISES FOR SECTION LEADERS.

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1. The instructor must go to the ground and frame the exercise before carrying it out with students.

2. The problems set for solution must be confined to the section. Occasionally the students should be asked what their action would be as platoon commander, on the assumption that the platoon commander and platoon sergeants were casualties.

3. The scheme must be simple and the imaginary action of units, other than the one being actually dealt with, should be touched upon very briefly.

4. The students should be divided into syndicates of three or four members each. Different members should be appointed spokesman for giving the syndicate solutions of each separate problem.

5. The instructor explains the general scheme, then sets a problem, and tells the students how long they can have to reach a decision.

6. Each syndicate discusses the problem and makes a decision which the spokesman gives as the syndicate solution.

7. If any member of a syndicate does not agree with the syndicate solution, he should be allowed to give his solution, otherwise every member of a syndicate will be considered to have agreed to the syndicate's solution.

8. After hearing the syndicate solutions, the instructor will discuss the points of difference, ending up with giving what he considers the best solution, pointing out the principles and influencing factors which give balance in favour of his solutions.

9. The instructor and students must guard against wasting time on discussions of minor details which involve no principle, or training lesson.

10. Definite decisions must be insisted on and no vague solutions accepted.

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